

S

UNIVERSITY
of
PENNSYLVANIA
LIBRARIES

378.748
POP. 14

University of Pennsylvania Library
Circulation Department

Please return this book as soon as you
have finished with it. In order to avoid
a fine it must be returned by the latest
date stamped below.

~~NOV 28 1951~~

~~JAN 2 1951~~

~~JAN 2 1951~~

LIBRARY
OF
UNIVERSITY
OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Ethics of the Stoics.

A Thesis.

Presented to the Faculty
of the
Department of Philosophy,
University of Penna.

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by John G. Bawn
May 1895.

The Ethics of the Stores

Presented to the Faculty

Department of Philosophy
University of Tennessee

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by John P. Gorman
May 1922

378.748

POP.14

Outline.

Introduction; condition of Greece in earliest times; chief sources of early history; religious ideas, allegorical & ethical interpretation; supposed divergencies from the faith; independent thinkers, the prototypes of the great Ethical Schools; spirit of inquiry, seeking for "a rule of action"; first speculations cosmological; ethical conceptions began with Pythagoras; Heraclitus the fore-runner of the Stoics, fragments of his work "On Nature"; Democritus; the Sophists; Socrates the wise, his method, beginning of ethical systemizing; rise of the four great Socratic Schools, 1st The Platonic School, from whence issued the Academic & Peripatetic sects; 2nd The Megaric School; 3rd The Cyrenaic which passed into Epicureanism; 4th The Cynics, out of which arose, the Stoic School.

Division of the subject, into two general heads, viz,
I That period from the time of ZENO, to the introduction of Stoicism to the Roman world.

II Stoicism, as it flourished among the Romans.

I, That period from the time of ZENO &c. Political & intellectual condition of Greece at this time; Zeno, beginning of his public career at the Stoa or Porch; his successors Cleanthes & Chrysippus; Analysis of the Ethical System of the Stoics, viz: their Physical theories, "Living in agreement with Nature" explained, Rational activity, Pleasure, The Affections, Virtue, The Virtues & Vice, The Ideal Wise Man, The Good and goods, The Good as LAW, After changes to meet practical wants, The Class of things Indifferent enlarged, Duties also included, Social Relations, Public Life, suicide, Morals as applied to Religion; Stoicism a practical system; its spread in Greece; greater in Rome.

II, Stoicism in Rome &c. Early customs & usages of the Romans; influx of Greek teachers to Italy; Stoicism introduced to Romans by Panaetius; Stoicism under the Republic; and under the Empire; the growth of stoicism until time of Nero; his cruelty to philosophers; philosophy proscribed; Seneca, his character & writings; he is chosen as one of the three opponents of Later Stoicism; his modification of the system; Likeness of Seneca's writings to St Paul's Epistles. Epictetus, the 2nd exponent of later Stoicism, his ethical views; condition of the Roman world under the reign of the Stoic Emperors, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus and Marcus Aurelius; The later our 3rd exponent of later Stoicism, his ethical "Reflections", his persecution of the Christians explained; Review of old & later Stoic doctrines, their points of agreement and wherein they differ; Decline of Stoicism, increase of Christianity, Constantine the first Christian Emperor; Rupture of the old conditions of society, through the capture of Rome by the barbarians; Stoicism ceases to be a distinct philosophy; our debt to Stoicism; conclusion; Cleanthes hymn to ZEUS.

The Ethics of the Stoics.

The beginnings of the Greek race are lost in the obscurity which envelopes all pre-historic times; a mystery all the deeper, because from national pride, the Greeks have never been willing to acknowledge any other cradle than the civilized land of Greece; though the legends of this people speak clearly of foreign elements in their civilization and in religious worship which came from the east.

The history of this land becomes all the more interesting as its people have been looked upon as obedient to reason, interpreting thought in clear form and graceful expression; in the state defining duties and the rights of citizenship;

and not unmindful of social feelings and sympathies.

The chief types of poetry and prose originated with them, and their writings are viewed as the fountain head of the literature of Europe.

But it is not my intention to enter into the history of Greece, other than to trace as concisely as possible, the evolution of the Greek conscience in the realm of Morals; or, more particularly that side of the subject which leads up to and deals with the Ethics of the Stoics.

From various kinds of information which we possess, respecting the social condition of the people, we might reasonably believe, that a fairly well ordered state of society existed, even in an age we might almost call legendary.

There was considerable civilization and knowledge of the Arts; they were superior to the other peoples

around them, in government, literature, language and manners; refined of thought, humane, courteous and exhibiting moral traits; though they had no system of morals before the time of Socrates, i.e. about 450 years B.C.

The chief sources of early Greek views of life are drawn from Homer (850 B.C), Hesiod, Solon and the seven Wise-men of Greece, certain Orphic or legendary Poesies and Pherecydes (600 B.C), who was one of the early Greek philosophers: from such literary remains and other minor or less distinct sources, are gathered fragments, quotations, or germs of precepts for conduct, as maxims, saws and reflections. †

These precepts were mixed up with a sort of a religion and fable, which consisted of the beauty of the world and the deification of such heroic human qualities as strength, or prowess; the gods and heroes degraded by passions and brutality, and their highest and purest concep-

† Ueberwegs Hist. of Philos. Vol. I. § 8.

Zeller's Outlines of Greek Philos. pp. 7. 12. & 27.

tions of God, anthropomorphic [†]

And yet the mixing up of religion and myth, was but the roughest form of spiritual prayer, - the crudest conception as entertained by unenlightened men of divine or supernatural powers, which they desired to invoke in time of need or distress, or to show forth their gratitude for favors received: what is the conception of Zeus as a god, who turns everywhere his shining eyes and beholds all things, but the adumbration of the doctrine of the one true God of revelation, "whose eyes are in every place, beholding the evil and the good".

The Homeric poems give us some notion of early religious ideas and practices; the gods were viewed as human beings of magnified powers, capable of pain and pleasure, and of assuming all powers at will, travelled with miraculous speed, lived on heavenly food and were exempt from mortality; they were rulers and guides

[†] The Ancient World & Christianity. p. 278.

of nations, teaching men through dreams, signs and portents. The heroes or demigods, were worshipped for their services to society, their deeds were superhuman and embodied those ideals of character and achievement which the early Greeks cherished.

In nothing was the piety of the men of that ancient time more manifested than in their prayers and supplications to these gods and heroes: for no one would undertake anything without first asking the direction and assistance of the gods, as the surest means of having his enterprises crowned with success.

Their morality was closely intertwined with their religion; and the myths of the gods came in process of time to personify certain virtues and blessings, as justice, concord, filial-piety, fidelity, pity, modesty, liberty &c; these and the like were represented under their respective emblems or appropriate representations, as Riches

was represented by the god Plutus, who was blind, to signify that wealth was dispensed to good and bad alike.

Fortune, was a goddess turning a wheel, which raised up some persons and threw down others at the same time.

And to further show the allegorical and ethical interpretation of which their myths and fables are to some extent susceptible, I have selected the following.

The gift by Jupiter to Prometheus of the beautiful Pandora, who was inclosed in a box with diseases, war, pestilence, famine, discord, envy; on the box being opened Pandora immediately appeared, and with her came into the world, all the calamities concealed in the box, but Hope remained at the bottom. The meaning of which by a free interpretation is, that the most beautiful and estimable things in this world are sometimes connected with the most grievous misfortunes; but that in every

affliction, man is comforted with the Hope of relief, and of better days to come.

The love of Cupid for Psyche, was an allegory to show that all true affection is toward the mind; and that the gift of life to an intelligent being, is only of value according to the understanding and goodness which he possesses.

The Graces or Virtues, were represented as three beautiful females, hand in hand, to show that Virtues though different, belong to each other; the Graces were beautiful and unadorned to signify that kind affections are pleasing; and gentleness of manner sufficient without art, to gain good-will.

In these myths and fables efforts seem to have been made to reconcile the stories of the gods with the religious and moral sentiment, and thereby inspire a feeling of reverence for the gods, esteem for the bravery of the heroes, and an admiration for the beautiful and the good.

No doubt the masses among the Greeks believed what was taught by their religion, of the doings of the gods and their relations to men; associating with their worship, the highest notions of sanctity, seeing nothing but what was beneficent in it, and viewing the deities as favoring justice, humanity, temperance and wisdom: believed also in the eminent fitness of honoring the names of their heroes, as benefactors.

They must therefore have addressed their prayers and paid their vows to the gods in all sincerity; asking for favorable winds, refreshing rains, fruitful seasons and deliverance from pestilence; believed too perhaps, that the good would be rewarded and the evil punished.

They may have noted some things most perplexing in their creed, but doubtless passed them over, as we do ourselves in passing over objectionable passages in the Bible, or of excusing seeming immoralities for the sake of the moral

lessons which grow out of this history or the other narrative; so that their religious sentiment transcended the seeming inconsistencies of their belief, and so became the source of their morals and their culture.

But I think there must have been another class of worshippers among those early men, who perceived that many of the actions of the gods were lustful and passionate and pleasure-loving, prosecuting their loves and practicing deceit; hence this class, must have found in these baser actions of the gods, an extenuation for their own selfish and wanton conduct; for among the deities were frequent breaches of chastity, and whose feasts and sacrifices were often attended by revels and wild orgies: if then this class of worshippers should form a debased notion of the gods and their worship, to suit their own loose morals, "plucked pleasure lightly and carelessly from the trees of the garden

of life, or trod the paths of enjoyment without anxiety", considering pleasure and indulgence as the only material of a happy life,—they could but ascribe such motives and practices to the examples of the gods, who must consistently sanction their follies and their pleasures.

And still possibly there was another class, those who avoided excess in eating and drinking &c, who would abstain from animal food because of their belief in the doctrine of metempsychosis. The very excesses and extravagancies which they saw in their religion, would but serve to incite them to repress excesses in their own habits, and control the gratification of their own more animal natures; and so by a discipline of continence, temperance, simplicity and fortitude be enabled to perform acceptable duty to the gods and to men.

And I think there must have been also another class, who rather ridiculed the gods,

and spoke of them with contempt, who viewed their practices as shameful and indecent, and who perhaps asked such questions, as, why Zeus begat separate families of men in the shape of a bull, ant, serpent or swan?; and how could his mistress become a she-bear?.

Why the gods changed into plants, beasts and stars?

This class would take nothing for granted, but must test the dogmas of religion by the light of reason, and so would become sceptical of the old faith, — begin to speculate on its absurdities and its immoralities, — perhaps longed to break away from the old traditions.

These are some of the subjective differences, which I think we might reasonably expect to find among men like the Greeks, with strong imaginations and vigorous reasoning powers: and these subjective differences, when the Greek mind set itself to reflect upon the national religion, would result in the production of widely

diverse systems of morals.

These several classes may possibly be considered as analagous to, probably were the forerunners of, those noted schools in Philosophy and Morals, which long afterwards made their appearance among the Greeks, viz, the Socratic, the Epicurean, the Cynic and Stoic, and the Sceptical Schools.

Whether my view be wholly right or not, it nevertheless seems to me, that there may have been at a very early time, divergencies from the orthodox faith, through earnest men seeking to solve some of the many problems which were forcing themselves upon their attention: or through the efforts of others, seeking perhaps to reconcile differences of opinion with regard to duty both to the gods and to men.

It is evident that there was in the air, a spirit of inquiry: men began to look out on the world around, - tried to think about their

relations to it, and the world unseen; they speculated upon the laws of nature, constructed systems of the universe, longed to understand the mysteries of, and to disentangle the truth about the world in which they lived, out of which they might be furnished with a rule of action, a standard of what was right and wrong: but they were handicapped in their attempts to solve these problems, for they had no method to help them, no rules to guide them in the search, and therefore their progress was slow and laborious.

Their thoughts and speculations were all at first cosmological, and out of their materialistic views of the manifold life, they sought "the principle of things". They were concerned with the sensuous, or external in its simpler forms; their age was the childhood of philosophy, and was but preparatory to a more reflective thinking, directed inward, which was deeper, or more subjective, having also

a tendency to ethical reflection and speculation.

Passing by such sages as Thales, who may be included in the immature stages of philosophy, because mainly concerned with the theories of nature, we come to Pythagoras (582.B.C.), who is reputed to be among the first who began to formulate ethical conceptions. He is thought by some to be more of a moral reformer than a scientific teacher; this is probably owing to his ethical temper, as seen in the religious Brotherhood or Association which he founded, whose aim was the moral education and purification of the community; its members being bound by laws of abstinence, hardihood and religion. To this philosopher among other things, is also ascribed the doctrine of Metempsychosis. His followers gave a mathematical form to their ethical notions, symbols taking the place of definitions; for example, justice was defined as a square number, intended to express what is due; good was connected

with straight, light &c; and evil, with their opposites.†

His admirers would graft his mystical religious asceticism, on the doctrines of Plato, of whom he is considered the forerunner.

We come now to a philosopher in whom we are especially interested Heraclitus of Ephesus, (b. 535.B.C.) one of the most profound metaphysicians of ancient Greece, the character of whose writings is obscure and epigrammatic: the kernel of whose doctrine, being that Contentment or Happiness is the greatest (highest) good to be sought for in life.

He is important to us in this essay, because he is regarded as the forerunner of Stoicism.

He wrote a treatise "On Nature", of which only a few fragments remain; in this work he gives his views regarding the Universe, Politics (including Ethics) and Theology, but couched in language so figurative and intricate, as to baffle critics and philosophers.

I shall make no further attempt

† Uebermeg's Hist: of Philos: Vol: I. §. 16.



to penetrate the obscurity of his writings, than to quote some of these "fragments" bearing on the subject of Morals, and then add the commonly received interpretation of his views.

Fragment XIX. There is one wisdom to understand the intelligent WILL by which all things are governed through all.

LXXI. The limits of the soul you would not find out, though you should traverse every way.

LXXIII. A man when he is drunken is led by a beardless youth, stumbling, ignorant of where he is going, having a wet soul.

LXXIV. The dry soul is the wisest and best.

XCI. The LAW of understanding is common to all. Those who speak with intelligence, must hold fast to that which is common to all, even more strongly than a city holds fast to its law, for all human laws are dependent upon one divine LAW, for this rules as far as it wills, and suffices for all.

XCII. Although the law of REASON is common, the majority of people live as though they had an understanding of their own.

XCVI. For human nature does not possess understanding but the divine does.

C. The people must fight for their law as for their walls.

CI. Greater fates gain greater rewards.

CM. Presumption must be quenched, even more than a fire.

CIV. For men to have whatever they wish, would not be well. Sickness makes health pleasant and good; hunger, satiety; weariness, rest.

CV. It is hard to contend against passion, for whatever it craves it buys with its life.

CVI. It pertains to all men, to know themselves, and to learn self-control.

CVII. Self-control is the highest virtue, and wisdom is to speak truth, and consciously to act according to nature.

CVIII. It is better to conceal ignorance, but it is hard to do so in relaxation and over wine.

CXIII. To me, one is ten thousand if he be the best.

CXIV. The Ephesians deserve, man for man, to be hung, and the youth to leave the city, inasmuch as they have banished Hermodorus, the worthiest man among them, saying, "Let no one of us excel, and if there be any such, let him go elsewhere and among other people." †

The general notion of his ethical views has been gathered from several ancient sources, and may be said to be comprised within the following summary. The end of life is to enjoy Happiness, and for this purpose the body should have repose, and its wants be confined within the narrowest limits possible: it is more important for men to know themselves than to acquire extensive learning: human life is the death of the soul, for while it continues in the body, it is confined and depressed, and never gains its true freedom and

† *Heracleti Ephesii Reliquiae*. J. Bywater

Heracleti Ephesii Fragmenta.

Dr G. W. Patrick.

activity, until it returns to the divine nature from which it comes: the first virtue is to be temperate, and the first wisdom is to follow nature: all human laws are founded upon one divine law of necessity which governs all things. †

Zeno and the Stoic philosophers incorporated into their system, the most pertinent parts of these tenets of Heraclitus, both of physics and morals.

We pass now to another master in the speculative and physical sciences, Democritus (b. 460 B.C.) one of the founders of the Atomic doctrine; whose cosmical theory has held a permanent place in philosophical thought. In his view of morals, Democritus placed Happiness, as the "summum bonum", this, he said could be attained by avoiding extremes and observing the limits fixed by nature. Thus fear and strong desire, all that is likely to bring sorrow or care, should be shunned; moderation is the first law of wisdom, and the

† *Historia Critica Philosophæ* Vol: I p 472. W. Enfield LL.D.

highest satisfaction comes from knowledge. †

Democritus was relatively as important to the Epicurean, as Heraclitus was to the Stoic School; for the main principles of the physics and moral teaching of Democritus were adopted by Epicurus.

The insufficiency of attempts to solve the problems of existence, and dissatisfaction with the inquiries and speculations as to the possibility of penetrating the secrets of the material world, led to the appearance of a group of men, called the Sophists; prominent among whom were Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias and Prodicus.

These Sophists made their appearance between 450 and 400 B.C. They took the ground, that "the essential nature of things could not be known, or if known could not be stated."

This negative position which they took, in respect to physical inquiries, led them to consider their relation to other men, and the study

† Ueberweg's Hist. of Philos: Vol. I. § 25.

of human affairs: so they set themselves to provide a general or literary education for the rising youths who expected to enter public life, and such instruction was given by public lectures; a means never before attempted.

These Sophists were a clever set of men, with considerable talent and influential connections; to them flocked youths from nearly every city: they were recognized teachers of ORATORY, POLITICS and DISPUTATION, or as Prof. Sidgwick puts it, "they taught the art of getting on in the world and of managing public affairs": they mingled "expositions of different virtues with prudential justification of virtue, as a way of obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain".

These teachers seemed to have no doctrine in common, each had his own views, though they all claimed among other things, to instruct men in morals by "showing them how to live well and manage each his own affairs," and

this was but guiding men to "the best way of living, from the points of view of both virtue and self-interest at once."

But the Sophists came to be viewed with suspicion, because of their boast, that "they could make the worse, appear the better reason; this, it was said of them was their avowed object, - and so they were looked upon as reprehensible: they were also considered sceptical in their views, as is shown in a passage from the speech of Callicles, in Plato's *Gorgias*, "Philosophy is a graceful thing when it is moderately cultivated in youth; but if any one occupies himself with it beyond the proper age, it ruins him."

In their visits to different cities, the Sophists noted the various laws and ordinances, which in each place were carried out.

This very variety impressed them with the belief that there no such things as RIGHT and WRONG by nature, but only conventionally:

this led to their denial of abstract Truth and Justice, asserting that "For man there is no eternal RIGHT, because no eternal TRUTH, law was but the law of each city. That which appears just and honorable for each city is so for that city, so long as that opinion is entertained".

Suddenly there appeared among these brilliant and showy teachers, an antagonist whose method was as strangely different from theirs, as in appearance he was rude and ungainly - Socrates, the wise .

Like them he seemed to court notice, lived much out of doors, and was ever talking to the young men gathered about him; but unlike the other teachers, he made no display of his knowledge, indeed affected to know not anything: the other teachers demanded large compensation, he asked nothing, he explained his mission, by reference to his mother's profession,

what she did for women in labor, he would do for men, by assisting ideas in their birth, and having brought them forth, examined them to see if they were true or false, fit to live or be destroyed:[†] and thus he believed he could be of service to his fellow-men by helping them to learn.

Socrates (b. 469 B.C.) was the son of poor but respectable parents; he learned his father's trade but early relinquished it, for Crito—a wealthy Athenian (as we learn from Diog. Laërtius) charmed with the young man's character educated him at his own expense.

Socrates studied physics but abandoned that, and instead of trying to account for the universe, he was ever craving for "a light to show him, his own path through it" ^x

Socrates agreed with the Sophists, to make man as a logical and moral being, the object of reflection and study: but they were content with what concerned the elementary

[†] Lewes Hist. of Philos: article on Socrates.

^x Maurice's Philos: Vol. I. p 113.

functions, as perception, opinion and desire; while he directed his attention not only to these but more especially to the highest intellectual functions which stand in relation to knowledge and virtue.

Virtue was dependent on knowledge or moral insight, the former flowed from the latter: all vice was ignorance. †

Prof: Sidgwick very neatly explains this Socratic view of VIRTUE OR KNOWLEDGE.

True knowledge would produce uniformity in men's moral judgments and conduct: it is ignorance that produces the contrary; for example, it is men's ignorance of justice, which is the sole cause of unjust acts. That every one wishes for his own good, and would get it if he could, is evident; and if he recognized that justice and virtue were not only goods, and of all goods the finest, then he knowing what were just and righteous acts, would prefer nothing else; while those who did not know, could

† Ueberweg's Hist: of Philos Vol. I. § 33.

the first of these is the fact that the
the second is the fact that the
the third is the fact that the
the fourth is the fact that the
the fifth is the fact that the
the sixth is the fact that the
the seventh is the fact that the
the eighth is the fact that the
the ninth is the fact that the
the tenth is the fact that the
the eleventh is the fact that the
the twelfth is the fact that the
the thirteenth is the fact that the
the fourteenth is the fact that the
the fifteenth is the fact that the
the sixteenth is the fact that the
the seventeenth is the fact that the
the eighteenth is the fact that the
the nineteenth is the fact that the
the twentieth is the fact that the
the twenty-first is the fact that the
the twenty-second is the fact that the
the twenty-third is the fact that the
the twenty-fourth is the fact that the
the twenty-fifth is the fact that the
the twenty-sixth is the fact that the
the twenty-seventh is the fact that the
the twenty-eighth is the fact that the
the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
the thirtieth is the fact that the
the thirty-first is the fact that the
the thirty-second is the fact that the
the thirty-third is the fact that the
the thirty-fourth is the fact that the
the thirty-fifth is the fact that the
the thirty-sixth is the fact that the
the thirty-seventh is the fact that the
the thirty-eighth is the fact that the
the thirty-ninth is the fact that the
the fortieth is the fact that the
the forty-first is the fact that the
the forty-second is the fact that the
the forty-third is the fact that the
the forty-fourth is the fact that the
the forty-fifth is the fact that the
the forty-sixth is the fact that the
the forty-seventh is the fact that the
the forty-eighth is the fact that the
the forty-ninth is the fact that the
the fiftieth is the fact that the
the fifty-first is the fact that the
the fifty-second is the fact that the
the fifty-third is the fact that the
the fifty-fourth is the fact that the
the fifty-fifth is the fact that the
the fifty-sixth is the fact that the
the fifty-seventh is the fact that the
the fifty-eighth is the fact that the
the fifty-ninth is the fact that the
the sixtieth is the fact that the
the sixty-first is the fact that the
the sixty-second is the fact that the
the sixty-third is the fact that the
the sixty-fourth is the fact that the
the sixty-fifth is the fact that the
the sixty-sixth is the fact that the
the sixty-seventh is the fact that the
the sixty-eighth is the fact that the
the sixty-ninth is the fact that the
the seventieth is the fact that the
the seventy-first is the fact that the
the seventy-second is the fact that the
the seventy-third is the fact that the
the seventy-fourth is the fact that the
the seventy-fifth is the fact that the
the seventy-sixth is the fact that the
the seventy-seventh is the fact that the
the seventy-eighth is the fact that the
the seventy-ninth is the fact that the
the eightieth is the fact that the
the eighty-first is the fact that the
the eighty-second is the fact that the
the eighty-third is the fact that the
the eighty-fourth is the fact that the
the eighty-fifth is the fact that the
the eighty-sixth is the fact that the
the eighty-seventh is the fact that the
the eighty-eighth is the fact that the
the eighty-ninth is the fact that the
the ninetieth is the fact that the
the ninety-first is the fact that the
the ninety-second is the fact that the
the ninety-third is the fact that the
the ninety-fourth is the fact that the
the ninety-fifth is the fact that the
the ninety-sixth is the fact that the
the ninety-seventh is the fact that the
the ninety-eighth is the fact that the
the ninety-ninth is the fact that the
the hundredth is the fact that the

not do them if they would. Only knowledge, therefore can set a man free to realize his wish in right conduct; as a bad man is constrained by ignorance to do what is contrary to his real wish, which is always for his own greatest good.

Now this right manner of life, was to be attained through knowledge, and could be taught to duly qualified minds, in a word, the true art of life could be imparted.†

The VIRTUE which Socrates sought, was not that of the official of the Sophists, neither did he seek mere victory in disputation as they did, nor did he attach much importance to form; the one thing of importance to him, was the standard of right action, and in securing that, men would have a rule by which to order their conduct aright and know what is honorable just and good. Moreover in

the pursuit of this kind of VIRTUE, if one should happen to endure privation or penury, such a

† Sidgwick's *Outlines of Ethics* pp 24 & 25.

life would be richer in enjoyment, than in a life of luxury and ease.

The method of Socrates was a critical one of inquiry, which was often marked by irony, or affected want of knowledge, that he might thereby induce others to join him in discussion, and so conduct them, to what ought to be sought for in knowledge; that proving all things, they might hold fast to that which was good: he appealed to experience and analogy, setting forth the noble as opposed to the base, the just as against the unjust.

The high estimate he placed on the dignity of manhood led him to believe, that perhaps there was a certain divine element in the soul of man, that might be continued after death, and which element might receive (as indeed he believed in his own case, his *Daimonion*) some inner or special guidance.[†]

He entreated men to rise above the ordinary morality which rested on common custom, and to

[†] Ueberweg's Hist: of Philos: Vol: I. § 33.

obey the inner sense of right and also cultivate a love of friendship.

And yet withal he had such respect to law and obedience to the state, that he endured death, rather than be unfaithful to its code of honor, or violate its principles.

Socrates formed no real system, therefore there were no definite theories to be defended by his followers: his principles and method were however mostly used by them all, even as they were all largely interested in moral questions.

The fruitful life of Socrates, gave rise to several Schools of Philosophy, viz:

1st The Platonic, from which issued,

The Academic and Peripatetic sects.

2nd The Megaric, or Dialectical School.

3rd The Cyrenaic, which passed into Epicureanism &

4th The Cynic, out of which arose

The Stoic School.

These were the ideals, those followers of Socrates formed of their master; doubtless they drew from his teachings such views as harmonized with their own ideas: and while they all strove to carry out the method of their master, they were nevertheless in some particulars, led to conclusions widely different.

I shall dwell long enough on the first three of these Schools of Philosophy, to give an outline of the principles taught by each, and then with the last School, take up my line of argument, and the further development of my subject.

1st The Platonic School.

Plato (b. 427 B.C.) throughout his early manhood was the devoted friend of Socrates, with whom he remained ten years. After the death of Socrates, Plato began to teach in a grove near Athens, called Academia, and there founded

the first great philosophical school.

From his various writings, mainly his "Republic", we gather sufficient to formulate his ethical doctrines.

Plato held, that the highest good consisted in the knowledge of the first GOOD, i.e. Supreme Mind, or GOD. The end of this knowledge, is to render man as like to GOD, as human nature will permit.

Virtue is the most perfect habit of soul which adorns man, it also includes particular Virtues, according to the faculties or parts of the soul, for example, The Virtue of the Cognitive part of the soul, is WISDOM; of the Courageous part, VALOR; of the Appetitive part, TEMPERANCE.

JUSTICE, is a general virtue enabling each part to perform its own function.

PIETY, is justice, in duty to the gods.

FRIENDSHIP, is reciprocal benevolence.

The PASSIONS, are irrational motions of

the soul, excited by some apparent good or evil.

A parallel between virtue in the state and virtue in the individual is drawn, to show that the highest mission of the state is to train its citizens to virtue.

And in this ideal state, the three principal functions of the soul, find their counter-parts in a particular class of citizens: the first class of citizens, corresponds to the Cognitive part; the second (warriors), to the Courageous part; and the third (laborers), to the Appetitive part.

These classes are to labor for the good of all, form one family, and without selfish interests. The education of youths is to be encouraged; only the best qualified persons can rise to the highest stations.

The Academic Schools .

The School of Plato long continued famous, but passed through several changes,

or tendencies, on which account it was divided into the Old, Middle and New Academies.

The Old, taught the doctrines of Plato.

The Middle, included the 2nd & 3rd Schools, and was somewhat skeptical.

The New, embraced the 4th & 5th Schools.

The 4th School was the opponent of the Stoics; while the 5th School with some exceptions agreed with them: the general teaching of this last School was a combination of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines, and so prepared the way for Neo-Platonism.

Aristotle and the Peripatetics.

Aristotle, (b. 384 B.C.) was the favorite pupil of Plato, who called him, "the mind of the School."

Some twelve years after the death of his Master, Aristotle opened a school of Philosophy in a grove in the suburbs of Athens, called "The Lyceum;"

here he held daily conversations with those who attended him, walking as he discoursed, whence his followers were called "Peripatetics".

In his ethical theory, the highest good was Happiness; which consisted not in pleasure, riches or station, but in virtuous exercise of the soul. A virtuous life is in itself a delight. Virtue is a spontaneous act, the effect of design and volition, and is developed and completed by habit and reason.

Virtue is a certain harmony of life: in so far as it is connected with the control of the passions, it is MORAL: and in so far as it is connected with the order of the intellect, it is intellectual or DIANOETIC: all virtues are either moral or intellectual; the former consists in preserving that mean in all things which reason and prudence prescribe; it is the middle path between two extremes.

The first virtue is FORTITUDE, a mean betⁿ

timidity and rashness: TEMPERANCE, the mean between excess and neglect: GENTLENESS, the mean between anger and insensibility.

JUSTICE is the highest ethical virtue, combining law and obligation: EQUITY, corrects the defects of law. All passions tend to excess, but guided by reason, become the source of human greatness.

The Dianoetic virtues are, REASON, ART, SCIENCE and PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE.

a sensual life is brutish, a scientific life is divine.

FRIENDSHIP, is allied to VIRTUE, and consists in a perfect affection towards an equal.

In his treatise on POLITICS, Aristotle shows that only in the state is the ethical problem capable of solution, for while the state was organized for the protection of life, it also stood for the preservation of morals. Its basis is in the family; the harmony of citizens must be founded on agreement of opinion. The difference

between good and bad governments, is in the object pursued by the rulers, either for the public good or private gain.

The Peripatetics.

The followers of Aristotle, for several centuries after his death, gave up metaphysical speculation and confined their attention chiefly to a popular presentation of Ethics.

The later Peripatetics returned again to the conceptions of their Master.

2nd. The Megaric School.

Euclid, one of the most devoted disciples of Socrates, after the latter's death, withdrew with some of his fellow disciples to Megara, and there established a School of Philosophy.

Its chief merit was its Dialectics, for it was more occupied with the forms of thought, with a view to the discovery of particular rules, than the founding of any scientific system.

In his Ethical views, Euclid held, the chief-good is UNITY; but it is known by several names; at one time people call it PRUDENCE; at another time GOD; and at another time, INTELLECT.

He also held the opinion, that EVIL as the opposite of GOOD has no physical existence: all things which exist are GOOD by participation of their first GOOD (Deity), hence in the nature of things, there is no evil.

3rd The Cyrenaic School.

This School takes its name from the birth-place of its founder Aristippus, who was born in Cyrene, Africa.

When he was a young man he came to Greece and remained with Socrates, until the latter's death: later in life he became the head of a philosophical school in his native city. All physical speculation he avoided, because it was beyond man's understanding.

all his study was therefore concentrated on the moral constitution of man.

The ethical views of Aristippus seem to have taken their color from his own personality, for before he became the disciple of Socrates, he was given to luxury, gay and careless, with pleasure as his governing motive, so while Socrates was discoursing on the subject of good in the abstract, Aristippus was undoubtedly thinking how he might specify what it was, and he resolved it into the concrete, - pleasure.

He appears to have been favored in this conclusion by the principle held by Protagoras, "as the senses may deceive, we can only know that which is without us, by the impressions made on us": hence Aristippus argued, that as sensation does not deceive, when sensations are pleasurable, we naturally seek for their repetition, and shun those that are painful: Pleasure therefore must be, and is, the only positive good, and as such, is the end of life.

He did not deny mental pleasures, but the pleasures of the body were to be preferred, both for their intensity and duration. And as pleasure is fleeting and may be had only in parts, or sweet morsels as it were, each one should seek his own present pleasure, without any misgivings as to the future.

The Epicureans.

Epicurus (b. at Athens, 341, B.C.) adopted the Hedonic doctrine of Aristippus, giving it scientific direction by the incorporation of the ATOMIC theory and opinions of Democritus.

He made use of the same touchstone for TRUTH, as did Aristippus, and referred all his conceptions to sensation and feeling. He also made Happiness synonymous with Pleasure.

He contended that as all animals instinctively pursue pleasure, so should man, but with this difference, he should foresee what will be the result of his acts and thus avoid those enjoyments

which occasion grief, or at least know how to endure those pains from which great pleasure will result.

His thought of Happiness is not mere momentary enjoyment, but for the whole of life: the pleasures of body while not to be slighted, are small as compared with those of the soul, which embrace past and future, through memory and hope.

Wisdom or insight, consisted in knowledge as to the proper course to pursue, by which a happy or virtuous life might be attained, and from it all virtues proceeded.

The Virtuous man was he, who was able to proceed rightly in his search of pleasure, which he would find without fail.

4th The Cynics.

Another of Socrates' disciples was Antisthenes, who enjoyed the intimate personal friendship of his master, whom it is said he most

resembled in appearance: after the death of Socrates he opened a school in the Gymnasium at Athens, called the Cynosarges, whence this school was called "The Cynic School."

He taught that Virtue was the only good; enjoyment as an end of life, was only evil; the essence of Virtue lies in SELF-CONTROL.

Virtue is capable of being taught, and when once acquired cannot be lost.

Whatever is between Virtue and Vice is INDIFFERENT. "Virtue does not require many words, only Socratic force".

No possible form of government pleased him, and he demanded that men should return to a natural state.

The wise man is removed from society in order to make him a citizen of the world.

Antisthenes made a moderate use of Dialectic, but his followers renounced every kind of scientific pursuit, on the ground, that the

speculations of philosophy are unnecessary to those seeking virtuous habits and manners.

One of the most prominent members of this school was Diogenes of Sinope, who is commonly accepted as a fair type of the Cynics; and the extravagant stories as related of his brutish, ostentatious habits and unnatural manners, have branded these men as degraded and degrading; so that they have been reviled, and their best motives impugned as selfish, indecent and arrogant. While this may to some extent be true, nevertheless there are some points in the character of the Cynics, that justly call forth our admiration; and instead of vilifying them, we should rather pay a tribute of respect and regard to their energy and perseverance in their endeavor to attain to virtue.

That they pushed self-denial and self-control to extremes and often held men and manners

in contempt is highly probable; but we must remember that they had no recognized ready-made rules to which they might conform their conduct, or shape their actions, but were seeking to educe a plan. We should bear in mind too, that they were but reacting against the luxury and the effeminacy of the times; and in their renunciation of ease and comfort, in the practice of abstemiousness and fortitude, and the subjugation of the sensual desires, they were protesting against the vices of the age, and attempting a reformation of society in that profligate capital city, Athens.

More than that, they were striving to attain a manner of life, or, evolve principles or doctrines which might lead to the moral perfection of men.

The independent character of the "Sage of Athens", had won the admiration of these men, and while they may have pro-

-duced an ill-shapen copy of his strength of will and power of self-assertion, and misunderstood his subtilty of thought, yet have they at least shown us, how some of ^{our} fellows, could despise wealth, honor and pleasure; and endure labor, hardship and ridicule, that they might realize their hopes of living a life in accordance with their notions of VIRTUE, SIMPLICITY and FREEDOM, and of acting out their principles at any sacrifice.

As might be supposed Cynicism, had not a large following, for with its strange singularities, its great self-denials, and the heroic qualities required to regulate and subjugate the ordinary desires of life, it was never popular as a philosophy, nor did it contribute much gain of a positive character to ethical science, but it paved the way for another great school of moralists, The Stoics, which I now take up,

The Stoics.

In treating this subject, I shall divide the history of the School into two principal divisions, viz:

1. *That period from the time of Zeno, to the introduction of Stoicism to the Roman world; and,*

II. *Stoicism, as it flourished among the Romans.*

1. *That period from the time of Zeno, to the introduction of Stoicism to the Roman world.*

The Stoic system like the great Socratic Schools, we have just been describing, took its rise in Athens, under Zeno at the close of the 4th Century B.C.

Though it arose on Greek soil, it is hardly considered the result of purely Greek thought, but rather the outgrowth of that interaction

between EAST and WEST, which followed the conquests of Alexander.

At the close of this century, Greece was far from being as strong politically, as she once was: Prof Jebb explains, how that disunion was prevalent in her politics, her liberties endangered, and Athens, once the natural head of free Greece, was no longer paramount in power, for her vital force was decaying †

Nevertheless the city was still, the intellectual centre of the civilized world: to her came old and young, philosophers and students from all parts of her own land, from Asia-Minor and the far EAST, and from the Isles of the Sea, to sip at the old fount of knowledge.

It was a period too when the old customs and the old religion were on the wane, even the national literature was sinking into a decadence, for men began turning their thoughts to something better, seeking something more satisfying

† Encyclop: Brit: Article, Greece.

for their religious aspirations than the myths of the gods, or the fables of Homer and Hesiod; hence they were open to hear and weigh the merits of any system of morals, philosophy or religion, that might offer the safest guide to conduct, or satisfy their spiritual cravings.

The influence of the several great Socratic systems were being more or less felt in Athenian society, for each of these schools had its followers, who advocated its merits.

Then it was that Zeno, about 320, B.C., when some 30 years of age, like many young men of his day, left his distant home at Citium in Cypress, to come to Athens, some say in a merchantile capacity; but, as he had read some of the writings of the great philosophers of Greece, doubtless he may ^{have} sought to accomplish a double purpose, that of pushing trade, and learning something more of science.

At all events he came to Greece, and nothing

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY
1207 EAST 58TH STREET
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637
U.S.A.
TEL: (312) 763-7200
FAX: (312) 763-7201
WWW.CHICAGO.EDU
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637
U.S.A.
TEL: (312) 763-7200
FAX: (312) 763-7201
WWW.CHICAGO.EDU

daunted because of his shipwreck and loss of goods in the voyage thither, soon sought out a teacher in Crates, the Cynic, whose instructions he admired. He could not however reconcile himself to the peculiar manner of his master, so he turned to other teachers; at one time it was Stilpo, and at another time it was Xenocrates, until after nearly 20 years of study and experience, learning the various styles and methods of the several schools, Zeno determined he would be a master himself.

In the city were certain public buildings, as the Gymnasium, used for athletic exercises, or the discussions of philosophers &c. into these the several sects withdrew as they increased in number and influence.

To these buildings was then given such names as the Academy of Plato, the Lyceum of Aristotle, and so on.

In the city was also a Colonnade or Porch, called the "Stoa Poicile" or Painted Porch, once the resort of the Poets and richly decorated with paintings by the famous artist Polygnotus, which recalled many lessons of patriotism, and devotion to public duty.

At this place Zeno, gathered his pupils and there taught many years, as did also his successors: from this Stoa or Porch, their followers have been called Stoics; and their teachings, the doctrines of the Porch.

Zeno, while in some measure partaking of the doctrines of the Cynics, did not share their grossness or affectation; though he seems to have assumed the office of quasi-preacher, raising his voice of warning and entreaty, unfolding a new doctrine they had never heard before, or, if heard, had paid no heed. Doubtless he spoke of, or predicted a crisis in the times; for behold,

the old creeds were waning, the majesty of custom diminishing, Epicurean softness spreading, oriental skepticism prevailing and indifference everywhere apparent. Would not Athenians consider, repent and believe his new doctrine of safety? for he wished to save them ^{from} despair, levity and blasphemy, and would teach them the beauty of Virtue, show them the nobility of moral worth, and help them to realize the dignity of their manhood.

In this new preacher and teacher, the people saw a man of great sincerity, strong convictions, simple habits, and yet withal kind and gentle in manner. It is not strange that soon he had many scholars, which increased in number year by year, with ever increasing respect paid to himself; for by his dignity and purity, he soon won his way to the affections of the people, that they intrusted

him with the keys of the citadel; and after his death at 98, they erected a statue of brass to his memory.

Zeno's successor was Cleanthes, a man of unusual energy and of great industry, but so poor, that he was forced to gain a livelihood by drawing water for the gardens by night and by day, engaged in the work of the school; he was in every way fitted to uphold his master's teachings, though incapable of extending them, or of establishing them on a secure basis: this was reserved for and accomplished by his successor, Chrysippus, who expanded and deepened the principles of Zeno, giving completeness of detail, with vigorous intellectual treatment, and so presenting them as a perfected system.

He was a voluminous writer in defence of the sect, and it was said of him, "had there been no Chrysippus, there had been no Porch"; he died 206 B.C. Many eminent masters

succeeded in turn to the Presidency of the school; most of them came from other lands than Greece, as did also a goodly proportion of their adherents.

Although Stoicism flourished in Greece, it did not achieve its crowning triumph, until it was brought to Rome by the master Panaetius about 156, B.C; and there it underwent internal changes, and for two centuries or more was the creed of the best of the Romans.

I shall now give some explanation of the doctrines of the Stoics, or, more particularly, set forth as far as I can, the essential principles of their Ethics. This is by no means an easy task, as only fragments of the writings of the Greek Stoa remain, though the Roman authorities have come down to us almost unimpaired.

Had the writings of the older representatives of the school come down to us, the work of tracing the growth of the system and of showing how much credit

is due to this or the other teacher in expanding the system, would have been a comparatively easy matter, although authorities agree, that all the substance and spirit of the system, may be fairly attributed to its founder.

From the paucity of materials, there does not appear to be any better way of treating the subject, than the method suggested by Zeller,[†] namely, to treat Stoicism as a whole without referring to the contributions of any particular individuals.

From the practical character of the system, it would seem, that the Stoics fixed their attention almost exclusively upon Conduct, and that, determined the object and end of their philosophy: they therefore reasoned that the business of their philosophy was to teach Virtue, and as virtue and philosophy may be learned by exercise, so philosophy is virtue, and the several parts of it, so many virtues:

[†] Zeller's Stoics Epicureans &c. p 55.

Morality then was the focus in which all inquiries should centre: hence Ethics was made the subject of paramount importance.

And Zeno perceiving in scientific knowledge the indispensable condition of moral action and with a further view of rounding out his system, borrowed from the Academicians, the divisions of Logic, Physics and Ethics.

These divisions were fully recognized by Chrysippus, for the reason that all ethical inquiries must start with the study of nature, and the knowledge of what God is.

While Logic was compared to the shell of an egg, or the wall of a city, and declared to be of importance as an aid in discovering truth or of avoiding error.

As there is much in the Stoic ethics, about "living in conformity to nature", I shall begin the consideration of the subject, by finding out the meaning of the expression;

to obtain which, we must examine the physical theories of the Stoics.

They held, everything real is material. all things are produced by air-currents which coming from the centre of the object, diffuse over the extremities and surface, then return to the centre: they were led to give corporeal form to all substances, even to, day, night, month, years, emotions, judgments, good and evil, the soul and God: all actions were due to some material in the body.

This materealizing of everything had as its aim, to discover a basis for human action, since everything acts or is acted upon: yet the Stoics would not acknowledge holding a mechanical theory of nature, but explained their theory as dynamical, placing force above matter.

The part which acts (force) is the efficient cause, and from this, life and motion proceed; this force is to the world, as the soul is to man,

the highest cause, - Reason, - GOD.

The seat of this efficient force, some placed in heaven, and others said, it was in the sun.

When they invested GOD with reality, He was called, the Mind or Soul of the World, and was identified with a heated fluid, called, the All-penetrating Breath or Air-current, Ether or primary Fire, which penetrated all things, and had various names according to the material in which it resided; nor was there any difference between primary Matter, and Fire, Ether, Providence, Destiny, GOD.

From GOD all things proceeded, and all things will return to Him, at the end of every period of the world, and a new world will begin afresh.

If we contrast this Pantheism, pure and simple, with the views held by Heraclitus, we shall readily see, how much the Stoics were indebted to him.

Heraclitus conceived GOD as a fiery Ether,

of His work, he could claim relationship with the eternal Reason, and this identity would be all the closer, the more he gives play to the divine element within him.

This physical ground work, so to speak, would lend a sort of religious sanction and encouragement to all moral duties, provide a satisfaction for man's spiritual cravings, and inspire willing obedience to its highest requirements. A life conformed to, or living in agreement with Nature, was, in this sense, the highest good or Virtue.

Again while it is true that every animal by an unconscious instinct (impulse) pursues what is best suited to its nature, repelling what is injurious and attracting what is best suited to its nature (and well it is that they should be left to such guidance), man, because he has the gift of reason, should respect his better self, and be ruled by the divine principle within him.†

† Diogenis Laërtii de Vitis, Dogmatibus et Apophthegmatibus
Clarorum Philosophorum. J.A. Kraus.
Liber VII. § LII.

The naturalness of his life (his well being) will then consist in a rational action, suiting his thoughts and acts to the general law of the universe which surrounds him.

This is living in agreement with nature; and while there may be many ways of expressing this mode of living, they all mean the same thing, namely, that man can only lead a rational life, by conforming to this law; and he rises or falls in the state of Happiness, in proportion as he succeeds or fails in doing this with steady purpose.

The essential aim of the Stoic ethics, it seems to me, is the exercise of learning, - the learning of Virtue, for the very exercise of human activity, leads to right action, or moral life.

Rational activity, they contend is Virtue and Happiness: Happiness consists exclusively in Virtue: the good and the useful coincide with duty and reason †

The thought that in moral activity, man

† Diog: Laert: Lib: VII. § LIII.



may recognize himself as a conscious intelligence, obeying the divine intelligence of the Universe, exalts human personality to its utmost height[†]

The activity of man is directed to the individual, the particular; but the individual and the particular must be subordinated to the universal: appetite and emotion must be subjected to reason.

This philosophy was not therefore content with the reveries of calm submission, absorbed in the contemplation of the infinite will, but it braced the energies for active combat, and bade men resist and conquer.

Pleasure.

Pleasure they said was not an end, but a result of moral activity, different from Virtue in essence and kind. Pleasure in its very nature is perishable, Virtue is enduring and eternal. Pleasure is dependent on something external to itself, Virtue is independent,

[†] Diog. Laërt Lib. VII. § LIII.

its reward lies in its own nature, it possesses every condition of human happiness. Pleasure should not be an object of pursuit, as the Epicureans hold. Pleasure there is in virtu-

ous conduct, cheerfulness, peace of mind, as the wise man knows what true Pleasure is: but even this, though it may come as a consequence of noble action, should not be a rule of life. Pleasure while it is not always unnatural and bad, is nevertheless not a real good, and must not be sought as an end †

In their theory of Pleasure, the Stoics approached Aristotle's views, who said "Pleasure is a concomitant, but not of all activities, for the highest are without it, and it is of no significance when found".

The Affections.

As to the emotional part of man, the Stoics argued, that because he had an emotional side to his nature, he was not wholly virtuous

† Diog. Laërt, Lib. VII. § LII.

but might become so, by overcoming his emotions.

If reason alone is a sufficient guide for man, he must not value too highly the animal impulses, which also incite to action; he stands on a higher level than instinct, and he forfeits his privilege of manhood, if he forsakes the higher guidance for the lower.

If man was purely rational, no struggle would be required for the achievement of virtue, but as he is not, he is possessed of emotions and passions.

Now emotion or passion, is an impulse of the soul, which is contrary to reason and nature; it is a disorderly condition of the soul, brought about by erroneous judgments or false opinion †

These moods of the emotional nature, to the stronger kinds of which, we give the name of passions, were thought to have their seat within the reason. Some fault of judgment or of imagination, some false notion of good or evil, are at the root of these passions, making

† Diog. Laërt: Lib: VII. § LIII.



them dangerous and misleading. †
 Irrational fancy as to present good, gives rise to
Pleasure; while Desire, is a wrong estimate about
 the future; unreal imaginings of evil, cause
Grief as to the present, or Fear of that which
 is to come.

These four types of the
 Affections are all grouped around Pleasure;
 and may still be further divided: under
Fear, may be found the species, apprehension,
 hesitation, shame, perplexity, anxiety.

Under Grief, pity, envy, emulation, pain, sorrow,
 jealousy, confusion.

Under Desire, want, hatred, love, anger.

Under Pleasure, irrational elation over some-
 thing desirable, rejoicing at evil, extravagant joy.

On the analogy of bodily disease, these disorders
 of the mind are further divided into,

- (a) Chronic ailments, as fondness for glory or pleasure,
- (b) Infirmitates, as momentary weakness, pitifulness. x

These should be considered as disturbances

† Diog. Laert. Lib. VII. § LXIII.

x Ibid.

of mental health, which tend to upset the natural balance of the soul, and jeopardize its self-control.

These may be entirely suppressed, which can be done, for as all that proceeds from the will, is impulse, and therefore voluntary, it is in the power of the individual to yield or resist: until they are so suppressed, a constant battle must be fought, and warfare waged against the imagination, for no virtue can exist, where emotion remains.

It will be noticed that this complete suppression of the emotions, resulting in Apathy (*ἀπάθεια*) is in decided contrast with Plato and Aristotle, who sought for their regulation and governance only: while the Peripatetics allowed that certain emotions are not only necessary but even useful.[†]

This principle was essentially wrong, the Stoics contended; for whatever is faulty in the slightest degree, should never be permitted, but must be subordinated to reason, when it ceases

[†] Diog. Laërt. Lib. VII. § LXV.

to be faulty; otherwise, Virtue might be attained by means of what is wrong.

The wise man will see that the passions are not natural to man, except in so far as they are diseases which affect the body. He will strive to keep the mastery over such faulty fancies.

Virtue.

This was considered as a perfection in everything; it alone had a value for man.†

This is a state, the very opposite of passion or emotion, — Apathy, to which it was man's duty to attain; but this was only the negative side; in its positive aspect, Virtue is a right notion in regard to conduct.

In this view of the case, I think lies the abstractness and yet beauty of the system: it is one of discipline, restraining the passions, dignifying and strengthening the will, suggesting to man, to seek and find within himself freedom and independence; but to seek it in

† Diog. Laërt: Lib. VII. § LIV.

the will to be virtuous, subordinating his every act to the law of nature, in rational self-control.

Virtue in this sense becomes a true inwardness which imparts a regularity, a firmness to the whole man; it is an energy so to speak, which is felt in maintaining a harmony between the internal force and the external acts, producing a disposition (*διαθεσις*) to be consistent, and giving a character of rightness in every thing to which it is related.

This I think is the highest ideal of the Stoics, a virtue resting on the will to do good, and existing for the perfection and development of its own being.

Virtue, again as rightly ordered reason, is based on knowledge; it is therefore called knowledge; a health and strength of mind, as a means toward rational conduct, and includes two elements, the speculative and the practical.

Thus far the Stoics agree with Socrates, in

defining *Virtue*, as *knowledge*, and *Vice* as *ignorance*, and holding that *Virtue* can be taught † *Virtue* is to them, a combination of theory and practice, "in which action is always based on knowledge, and this finds its end in right conduct."

From knowledge proceeds a certain plurality of *Virtues*, and in this the *Stoics* adopt the division of *Plato*; making four cardinal virtues, as *WISDOM*, or knowledge,

COURAGE, as, fortitude and endurance.

JUSTICE, knowing how to give what is due.

TEMPERANCE, the ability to choose or withhold. ×

These primitive *Virtues* may again be subdivided into *MAGNANIMITY*, a lofty habit of mind;

CONTINENCE, a habit which never yields to pleasure.

ENDURANCE, a habit of sufferance.

PRESENCE of MIND, a habit of what is suitable under emergency.

WISDOM in COUNCIL, a knowledge of how, and what to do. ×

And analogously of *Vices*, some are primary and some subordinate; of the former there are,

† *Diogenes Laërt*: *Lib. VII*: § *LIV*.

×. *Ibid*.

FOLLY, COWARDICE and INTEMPERANCE; and among the latter, INCONTINENCE, SLOWNESS and Folly in COUNSEL. †

Of the Virtues and the Vices, each has its own end, but inasmuch as all virtues agree, so all Vices agree in themselves; hence the pursuit of one, involves that of the others: on this principle where one virtue exists, the others will also be found, and conversely, where one evil is, there will be discovered other evils also. ×

Furthermore as Virtue is indivisible, it must be possessed as a whole, or not at all. #

A right intention with an appreciation of good and evil, constitutes the virtuous man; but the intention must be good or bad.

The same, strange to say is true of actions and there are no intermediate degrees. ¶

All good acts are equally good, and the same is true of vices; for while some of the latter

† Diog. Laert: Lib. VII. § LIV.

× Ibid " " § LXIV.

Ibid " " "

do much, others only a little harm, they are to all intents and purposes, derangements of the soul, and no extenuations can be made for the slightest faults; the bad can do nothing right, and he who commits one crime is guilty of all. Mankind is therefore divided into two classes, the wise or philosophers, and the foolish or depraved. †

Another paradox was their "WISE MAN".

The wise man is free from all faults and mistakes, he is ever right and never wrong; he is beautiful, rich, happy: he alone knows how to obey and to rule, he only is virtuous, unselfish, self-controlled, passionless, hence he is perfect, lord of himself and master of the world. X

The conception of the "wise man", was ever open to much criticism, still it was undoubtedly useful, as a high standard of virtuous conduct; it was an image, or an ideal of duty for duty's sake, - reaching up continually to

† Diog. Laërt: Lib. VII § LXIV.

X. Ibid " " "

an ever higher summit of self-perfection.

The Good and goods.

As we have learned, the highest good was Happiness or Virtue, and there was no good independent of Virtue or Naturalness.

But existing things, they divided into, good (*agathia*, worthy), bad (*kakia*, evil, or corrupt), and indifferent (*adiaphora*).

The Good are the Virtues, prudence, justice, courage, temperance: the bad are their opposites as, folly, injustice, &c. †

The third class, indifferent, they made to consist of things neither good or evil, and are not to be sought after or shunned; in this class was placed, health, riches, honor, and even life, because none of these things are a good; as neither are poverty, sickness, disgrace or death, evils: for both of these might be used for good or evil, and therefore

† Diog. Laert: Lib: VII: § LX.

should be considered, indifferent. †

It was conceded, that there may be, and doubtless are many things, which while indifferent in themselves might lead to good, for example, there are good dispositions of the mind, as joy, affection, caution, good-will, good-spirits, modesty, reverence: in like manner there are opposite conditions of mind, as hatred, contention, enmity, anger, rejoicing over anothers misfortune; the former while not good, yet furnish certain advantages, and because of such, should be sought after: the latter cannot ever be advantageous, as they are harmful and should be shunned. ✕

The Good as Law

Finally there is another notion of the Good in the sense of LAW. As Virtue is a law which governs the world, and man is a subordinate part of it, that which GOD and

† Diog. Laert. Lib. VII. § LX.

✕ Ibid. " " § LXIII.

reason ordain must be binding on man, as partaking of that nature : and just so soon as that law is recognized, the claims of human law are made manifest ; so that impelled by the double obligation of moral and civil law, men should feel themselves bound to seek God, and avoid the evil ; to be moral instead of debased.

Zeller explains that owing to the narrow list of things admitted by the Stoics, as really good or evil, while numberless things were declared indifferent, and the paradoxical position taken regarding the wise man, changes and concessions were found necessary in their theory to meet practical wants : there was still too much Cynic leaven, too much contempt of the world and overlooking of common pleasures to suit the mass of men, craving for light and guidance in the path of duty. Therefore the picture of perfection as portrayed in the

wise-man was considerably modified: the state of apathy, was permitted to include some of the tender feelings of mercy and sympathy: old elements of emotion formerly excluded, were introduced under different names; the social instinct was acknowledged, and love and friendship find a place. †

And of that large class of things, formerly described as indifferent, things not good or evil in the highest sense, yet meeting a want, or helping to a higher good, - such as bodily advantages, gifts of fortune, were accepted under a new name (προνημερα) or things preferred; and these things were arranged in a scale of appreciation. The opposite of this class was called (αποπρονημερα) or things to be avoided. ×

Under things to be preferred or eschewed, a further division was made, so as to include two kinds of duties; the first were

† Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans &c. Chapt. XI.

× Diog. Laërt: Lib. VII § LXL.

called proper or perfect duties (κατορθωα), i.e. the higher proprieties of conduct: the second were called imperfect or intermediate duties (καθηκοντα), which embraced the various ^{duties} of every day life. ^x

Social Relations

The desire for society is involved in man's reason, by the aid of which he feels himself a part of a whole, and hence is bound to subordinate his interest to the interest of the whole, and while saying he is independent of every thing external, he is really only so, as to his thought, not as to society. Individuals being thus endowed with reason should and must exist for the sake of each other, and by mutual support with benefits conferred, advance each others interest. As all rational beings are intended for society, it follows that all who are wise and virtuous are friends, because they are



harmonious in their views of life, and love and admire each others virtuous conduct.

As this union has a certain value, it is included in the Stoic idea of goods.†

Marriage (from the ethical stand-point of the later Stoics) should command respect: such a union is natural and helpful.

But in marriage there should be chastity and moderation, love should be with reason, and neither beauty nor sensual gratification should enter into the question.

Public Life.

In none of the then existing forms of governments did the Stoics find their ideal; their dissatisfaction with them all, seems to have led them to an entire aversion to public life: not one of the old masters of the Stoa, ever entered on public life. This singularity I think, was a direct inheritance from the

† *Diog Laert: Lib. VII § LXIV.*

Cynics, as was also the substitute by which the Stoics thought to replace those ordinary relations of civil society, i.e. a citizenship of the world.

This cosmopolitan citizenship, was made the most of, and became a leading feature in the Stoic system; doubtless it had a very considerable attraction for men in those unsettled and stirring times.

By the character of this citizenship they held a double purpose in view, to express the oneness of mankind, and the Stoic's independence of country and home: these two thoughts were combined and beautifully wrought out by the later Stoics, in a universal Brotherhood of men, without distinction of country.

But this negative position which the Stoics assumed on all matters relating to public life, evidently shows their intention to subordinate politics to ethics.

Suicide.

In order to secure independence for men, under any circumstances, voluntary departure from life was permitted; this was the highest expression of moral freedom. †

While all are not advised to do so, yet every one is urged in case of need to receive death at his own hand, instance Zeno, Cleanthes, Eratosthenes, Antipater and others.

They justified this act, because life and death were viewed as indifferent.

We may well question whether a man can under any pretense, consider life and death matters of indifference: and in this mode of exit from life, Stoicism, exhibits its inconsistency when contrasted with its main doctrine, which required an absolute resignation to the course of nature, a submission to the will of God, a yielding unconditionally to man's predetermined destiny.

† Diog. Laërt. Lib. VII. § LXXV.

Morals as applied to Religion.

The moral theory of the Stoics (which brings out also its materialism) began with the recognition of the divine Being, as Reason, who manifested Himself everywhere and in everything in Nature, controlled the activity of man, who should submit to His will, and ended by resolving everything into Him.

It developed too, the idea of Providence in a way quite unknown before, and made the moral duty of man spring from this basis of religion: so that while a Philosophy, it was also in great part a Religion, and this is fairly well brought out in the beautiful hymn of Cleanthes to Zeus, which will be found at the conclusion of this essay.

To a large extent it was independent of the traditional religion, still efforts were made to reconcile the latter with the philosophic creed, hence the Stoics resorted to a method

of allegorical interpretation of the popular belief, and found in it a substratum of spiritual truth which could content the intellectual aspirations of the age.

They held that the name of God or Zeus, as the one supreme Being, may be applied to those objects in nature through which His power is exhibited, and to these manifestations as stars, years, months, seasons, fruits, wine, heroes, they gave the name of gods, and did not forbid their worship.

They attached importance to divination, or the interpretation of omens, that is, events might be revealed by flight of birds, the position of the stars, &c all of which was a concession to the popular religion.

They believed that all things in nature, took place by virtue of a natural unchangeable connection between cause and effect, and this absolute necessity was expressed by FATE or DESTINY

They also held the doctrine of Demons, guardian-spirits, &c, and that these to some extent exercised a part in man, and cared for him.

The soul was thought to be corporeal, since it extends in three directions over the whole body: it was described as breath, and again as fire. The mind was also spoken of as a fiery breath. The soul was a bond of union between body and mind, having its seat in the breast, and was supposed to discharge itself into the several organs of the body.

To the brain they assigned the seat of the reason or natural soul, as distinguished from the other or animal soul: the rational soul being the chief source from which all the other parts are derived.

I have presented the foregoing analysis of the ethical code of the Stoics, the principles of which had been developed and wrought out by its Greek masters in the Stoa, and which became a power in Athenian society.

This doctrine grew up beside the great Schools, whose teachers were the successors of Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus, and readily took such hold on the popular mind, as to create a permanent school of thought.

At the time of its birth and early growth, people were getting sick of politics and the confusion and distrust of public life, dissatisfied too with the traditional religion, or with mere skepticism: they were beginning to feel a hunger for a more definite faith, a surer hope and a larger charity; then it was that the Stoic theory, presented, in the first place, an intellectual fascination in its large pantheism, ingenious allegories and

theories of knowledge as adopted from all local creeds; and in the second place, it offered peace and happiness to whomsoever accepted its principles, in following the voice of nature and in obedience to the will of God, through the doctrine of divine Providence.

The lecture-rooms of the successors of Plato and Aristotle, now well established at Athens were crowded with disciples, still a very considerable number attended at the Porch, and while those who came, may have been less in number, than at the other schools (and a goodly proportion of them strangers, to hear teachers who oftentimes were Greek neither by birth nor education), yet were they thought to be, the more earnest seekers after knowledge, - the more thoughtful men of the day.

Of the many converts made to the new creed, some in turn became teachers, and

Stoic schools in due time were opened at Corinth, Elis, Colophon, Heraclea and other places. †

The need of the times was not so much theoretical knowledge as practical moral strength and this was even more keenly felt by Greece after her loss of independence, nothing remained then, but to oppose the inner self of the individual to the hopeless political situation, and seek contentment in the recesses of the soul: and when too the barriers were broken down that separated the East from the West, the Greek from the barbarian, — men became conscious, that moral life was a relation of man to man independent of nationality, and this consciousness found expression in philosophy.

Then it was that the Stoic principles of fortitude, self-control, inward serenity and contentment were understood and appreciated.

Stoicism spoke words of comfort by its

† Mahaffy's Greek Life and Thought. p. 144.

precepts, it taught that no public calamity or change of laws which might happen, could deprive men of their spiritual freedom, that the accidents and misfortunes of life, are but as trifles, even as nothing compared to the royal liberty of the wise man.

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that Stoicism filled a large place in the minds of men, and exerted a wide influence on Greek society in some of its busiest and most important times. But its influence was yet to be more extended and far-reaching, and this was after its introduction at Rome, by the later Stoics, who did much in re-stating, elaborating and toning down the harshness of their system, throwing new light on old truths, converting the hard and unsympathetic into the gentle, benevolent, and forgiving: tempering and modifying with humility, rendering milder and more attractive the proud and arrogant teaching of former days,

so that Stoicism became more religious, because more concentrated on Deity and less on Virtue, and approximated more nearly to that "new law of love," which was afterwards to absorb it.

II. Stoicism as it flourished among the Romans.

In her career of war and conquest, Rome extended her triumphs eastward and made Greece a Roman province (168. B.C.): as political unity between the two countries became established, intercourse between them was more intimate, until the culture and superior social usages of the conquered, so influenced the conquerors, that "the Roman empire became Greek though the Greek nation in name became Roman".

THE HISTORY OF THE

AMERICAN PEOPLE

By J. W. FULTON, LL.D.,
Professor of History in the University of California,
Berkeley, California.
Illustrated by J. W. FULTON.
Published by the
AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY,
New York, N. Y.
1908.

Up to this time the various systems of Philosophy were little known in Rome, indeed so occupied was she in pursuit of war and politics, that she had scarcely begun to reflect upon the mysteries of life and nature.

The various customs and usages of public life, the zeal of patriotism and of citizenship, the strictness and virtue of the home life, with appeals to emulate the virtues of honored ancestors, supplied the Romans with a definite rule of duty, which law and religion enforced. But now with new relations opening up with the older civilizations of the East, it became necessary for the chief families of Rome, to be somewhat familiar with the language, literature and art of Greece; by the side of which, the narrowness and coldness of their own national culture, became so apparent that Greek scholars and teachers were encouraged to come to Italy.

Some old-time conservative spirits did pro-

-test at the influx of this element, and measures were taken to banish what was viewed by them as an evil, but these objectors were unable to check the progress of that era of change, for the simplicity and rudeness of former days, were fast giving way to the wealth and power of a mighty and conquering people.

Hence a superior finish and wider culture must be introduced suitable to the growing dignity of Roman importance, and who could better impart this, than the Greeks?

So we read, that among others Aemilius Paullus, sent to Athens, for a good painter and sound philosopher, and they sent him Metrodorus, who excelled in both.

Occasional visits of philosophers were made to Rome on public business, as in the case of the embassy on a mission to Rome (155.B.C.) to secure the remission of a fine; these envoys consisted of Critolaus, the Peripatetic; Diogenes the Stoic, and Carnades the Academician: through these

visits, philosophy began to assert itself openly at Rome, by the brilliant discourses of these representative men; objections to their coming were not only withdrawn, but concessions made to them.

Later on, we hear of Panaetius (b. 156 B.C.) a Stoic philosopher, becoming an inmate of the house of Scipio at Rome, where he remained many years, and trained up a number of Roman nobles to understand and adopt his views, he afterward returned to Athens, and died at the head of the Stoic school there, 110 B.C.; he is regarded as the first who properly introduced Stoicism at Rome.

The practical philosophy of the Stoics, with its stern morals, had an attraction for the highest and most cultivated Romans, who possessed or were willing to acquire a knowledge of Greek in order to be taught it.

To Panaetius, it is said, came statesmen, politicians and magnates, "to learn something



better than effete polytheism, to give them dignity in their leisure and steadfastness in the time of trial": among his converts, were *Mucius Scaevola*, & *Jubero*, nephew of *Scipio* and *Rutillius Rufus*; men exceptionally noted for their purity and nobility of character. †

The example of *Scipio* was followed by many other of the leading families, until it became quite the proper thing for every patrician family to have a Greek instructor, just as it was the custom in more modern times to have house chaplains, or private tutors as amongst our own best families.

With such care were these sometimes chosen, that *Cato the younger* who was trained up under *Antipater of Tyre*, afterwards took great trouble to seek out *Athenodorus* at *Pergamum* and received him into his own household.

Epicureanism had also by this time found entrance into *Rome*, but was accepted by the lower classes, and then only to a

† Mahaffy's *Greek World under Roman sway*. p. 76.

See *Plutarch's Lives*.

limited extent; it never at any time seemed to produce a very sensible effect on the manners of the people.

But the settlement of Greek philosophy as a general thing became more and more decided, which extended even to Architecture, in literature, to the translation into Latin of Greek master-pieces; and this fashion in time included house-hold ornaments, exorbitant prices being paid for statues, pictures &c, from Greece. † As a consequence the various systems of Philosophy found each their respective adherents, though those who preferred Stoicism were in much greater numbers, and so dilligently was its Dialectic studied, that it is supposed to have had some after influence in the history of Roman jurisprudence.

Cicero himself made use of these exercises, indeed the career of Cicero (b. 106. B.C.) forms an epoch in the history of Greek letters at

† Mahaffy's Greek World under Roman sway. p. 81.

Rome, for he was the first Roman able to translate Greek thought of the highest kind: when a young man he received instruction from Diodotus the Stoic, and later in life, when by political intrigue he was forced to retire for a time from public life, he was occupied with literary pursuits and produced two works favorable to Stoicism.

While Cicero adopted many of the Platonic conceptions, so that he cannot be considered a professed Stoic, he nevertheless was a great admirer of their ethical doctrines, as the two works referred to abundantly testify, namely, "De Officiis" and "Jusculan Disputations"; the former being an outgrowth of a treatise, written by the Stoic professor Panaetius, on practical moral duties; and in the latter work, he adopts some of the Stoic views, about the emotions of the soul in its attitude and indifference to death; also the manner in which pain and

sorrow in its variety of forms should be borne, all of which breathe a spirit of resignation and Stoic fortitude.

Another remarkable man of this age, and the last champion of the "Republic", was Cato the younger, a devoted follower of Stoic principles who made them the underiating consistency of his life and conduct, almost to fanaticism; he distinguished himself in every public office which he filled, and waged a brave but hopeless warfare against the evil tendencies of the times, denouncing bribery and corruption in office in every form: and so sincere and patriotic was he, that he preferred losing the consulship than violate the laws. He withstood Caesar, Pompey and others in the civil war, and in defense of humanity, also contended that in the strife, no Roman city should be plundered, or Roman blood spilled except in actual conflict; through which means the life of Cicero

was saved and Utica twice prevented from being plundered. In this city, finding that he was unable to carry out his principles of a free state, and that it was about to perish, he felt he must perish with it, and died by his own hand.

In his last moments, he had been reading Plato's dialogue on the immortality of the soul, and with some friends calmly discoursed on philosophy (of which he was a great student), shortly afterward, gravely took himself off in the way his religion permitted.

Under the Empire, we find that Augustus rather sought the friendship of the Stoics, and was withheld from many cruelties and extreme measures by the exhortations of these philosophers.

The next Emperors, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius and Nero were considerably opposed in their tyrannical acts by the Stoics, with a courage that often reacted against them; but which nevertheless accomplished good results, for

many were emboldened by their steadfastness to turn to the doctrines of the Porch, as towards a religious creed, and history contains abundant proof of the wide-spread nature of the movement.

But in the time of Nero, the opposition took the form of a persecution; for several years attacks were made on prominent men of the several systems of philosophy, as they came under the Emperor's jealous eye, or fell under the suspicion of his favorites: then about the year 59. A.D., the persecution assumed a serious nature, philosophy was proscribed, and the principal Stoics were struck down by imperial direction.

Perhaps the real motive for Nero's cruel despotism may be found in the attitude of the Stoics toward the Emperor; after he had stained his hands with his own mother's blood, then it was that they showed their disapproval of his vices and crimes, and perhaps reprobated

the luxury, extravagance and degeneracy of the times To escape this persecution many fled the city; of those who remained, some were accused on false charges and imprisoned, some were banished as Cornutus, Rufus, Dion and others, and some were condemned to death; among the latter was the pro-consul Plautus, Paetus Thracea and Lucius Annaeus Seneca, the noted Stoic moralist and Prime-minister of the Empire.

Nero's hatred and cruelty in this latter case, seems unaccountable, for he had been trained in youth by Seneca, whom he afterwards made his chief adviser, and so long as the Emperor was influenced by his wisdom, the government was administered with energy; but this salutary influence waned as the Emperor became more wayward and despotic, until the treatment of his minister was turned to dislike, when Seneca petitioned his master to allow him to retire from public life, offering him his enormous

fortune: but even after his retirement he was charged with being concerned in a conspiracy against Nero's life, and was forced to commit suicide.

Our attention will now be directed to Seneca, as one of the three representative men, whom I have chosen from among the Stoic worthies of the Roman world, to exemplify the teachings of the later Stoics.

Seneca (b. 3.B.C.), was a statesman, a brilliant pleader at the Bar and a scholar, and of all the writers of that "silver age", he is considered the most eminent.

Although he was familiar with the world of fashion, still he endeavored to shape his life by Stoic rule, and while not a professed moralist, yet he has given the world, a most eloquent series of truths, which approach so nearly to the truths of Christianity, that the wonder is how he could have known

them without having heard them from inspired lips.

His writings are in the form of letters or moral sermons, in which he acknowledges that he is striving after an ideal, by which he might shape his own life, and perhaps be an instructor of others; this he was led to undertake because dissatisfied with the narrowness, harshness and often-times paradoxical character of the Stoic system of morals, and therefore sought to tone down its asperity, and temper it with gentleness, sympathy and religious fervor, that it might thereby be a more practical guide and common sense standard for human action.

How far he succeeded in doing this, we may best learn by some quotations from his own writings.

In reading his Epistles, we are impressed with the religious tone which pervades them,

of his oft repeated appeals to the mind and heart of Lucilius, whom he strives to draw from the vanity of the world, to seek for the true happiness of inward peace. In this religious tone he may have been more or less influenced by the insecurity of life and vicissitudes of the times, or, it may be indirectly through the enthusiasm of the Christian teaching: at all events, not only his writings, but it is said, all the philosophy of this period became decidedly more religious in tone.

Seneca expresses large hopefulness of the moral progress of men,[†] and in this he differs from the old views, which held that the mass of men could never become anything else but fools and scallawags; toward this progress, much may be done by maxims illustrations, rules to encourage or rebuke, counsels to advise and strengthen the weak, - all of which would act as way-marks to those pushing for-

† *L. Annaei Senecae Opera.*
Epist. LXXV.

Frid: Haase.

-ward on the road to Virtue: still he lays great stress on the methods of self-discipline, on the quickening of the conscience through quiet times of meditation and of communion of the spirit with the unseen world, as in the following, "we should set a watch on our lips, and attend the more useful and necessary work of contemplation.

The first petition that we are to make to GOD ALMIGHTY is for a good conscience, the second for health of mind, and then of body. There are some things which we directly wish for, as, joy, peace and the like as, patience in pain and sickness; others that concern our external behaviour, as modesty decency, and such a demeanor as may become a prudent man." †

But in nothing do we find a more direct difference from the old views, than on the nature of the soul and of immortality.

The original Stoic doctrine of the immor-

† Ep: XIV.

-tality of the soul, was, that souls exist after death until the end of the world's course, when they will be resolved into the primary Substance or divine Being: contrast this conditional immortality with Seneca's views.

"In the question of the immortality of the soul, it goes very far with me: a general consent to the opinion of a future reward and punishment, which meditation raises me to the contempt of this life, in the hope of a better" †

"And this you may be assured, that if it (the soul) survives the body, it can by no means perish, because it is not perishable; since no immortality admits an exception, nor can anything destroy what is naturally, eternal." x

"Death which we so much dread, puts off life for awhile, but does deprive us of it entirely: a day will come, which shall raise us again to light . . . things that seem to die and be lost, are only changed. Observe the circling course

†. De Beneficiis.

x Ep. LVII.

of things, you will see that nothing in this world is extinguished, but rises and sets alternately.†

"When the day shall come, that will separate this composition, human and divine, I will leave this body here, where I found it, and return to the gods, not that I am altogether absent from them even now; though detained from superior happiness, by this heavy clog. This short stay in mortal life is but the prelude to a better and more lasting life above another beginning, another state of things expect us, we cannot as yet reach heaven, till duly qualified.

Look then with an intrepid eye upon that determined happy hour. It is not the last to the soul, if it be to the body; whatever things are spread around thee, look upon them only as the furniture of an inn, we must leave them all and go on. This day which men are apt to dread as their last, is but the birth-day of an eternity, that blessed day when the mysteries of Nature shall

† Ep: XXXVI.

be revealed, the darkness be dispersed and the light break in. How then will it amaze you, when you shall behold that divine light in its full spread of glory in heaven. Such a reflection commands us to have always eternity in view†

Seneca is far from being satisfied with the conception about the wise man, and calls up certain inconsistencies, as if to show disapproval of his unnatural character. "Then after your grand professions that the sage is never poor, you admit that he may be in want of clothing, food and shelter.

You say that the sage never can be foolish, yet allow that he may loose his senses and utter silly words. After denying that the wise man can ever loose his freedom, you admit that he may be sold, and have to obey orders, and to do menial drudgery to serve his master. So after all your lofty aims, you go to much the same lengths as other folks, though you call things by new names. X

And as in contrast with this impassible sage

† Ep: CII.

X Dial: II. 3.

who knows no sorrow, can feel no pity and who has subdued all emotion; Seneca writes, "To lament the death of a friend is both natural and just, a sigh or a tear, I would allow to his memory." †

"Such decency is there in sorrow, which is always to be observed by proper boundary. There is something sweet in such indulgence in sorrow." ×

As to his notion of the Good, he says, "The *sumum bonum*", seeks not any external provision, it is maintained within, and is entire in itself.

A wise man wants nothing more than a sound elevated mind; contemptuous of the power of fortune, he is contented in himself" #

Of FRIENDSHIP, "there is a certain innate sweetness in it: for nature impells us to seek society: but what you term Friendship, is only traffic". "To what purpose should we choose a Friend: to have one whom we may serve in the utmost case of necessity, and follow him into banishment if need be".

"No good thing can well be enjoyed, save as

† De Vita Beata.

× Ep: IXc.

Ep: IX.

we have a friend to share it." †

There was a strong feeling of kindness in the nature of Seneca, one must be very slow indeed who does not see the effort he made to cast aside the hardness and coldness of his creed, and give scope and play to the emotional side of his character. This may be seen in his allusions to the pleasures of friendship; the tender sense of grief at the loss of friends; his repeated protests against the inhuman practices of the arena; ^x his plea for the removal of social obstructions, such as the differences between bond and free, his dislike of Cynical singularities, which would tend to isolate men, and prevent the growth of sympathy and good-fellowship. #

Had I space, many are the parallels, I could show between the meditations of Seneca and Holy Scripture, and because of an approach in his writings to the spirit of St Paul in his

† Ep: IX.

x Ep: VII.

Ep: IX.

Epistles, it is believed that the pagan moralist, must have felt more or less the influence of the christian Apostle. Indeed some letters have been brought forward, which profess to be a correspondence between the two, but these letters have been pronounced spurious. †

Another attempt has been made to connect the two, from the fact that Gallio (brother of Seneca) was the officer who refused to hear the disputes between St Paul and the Jews; and again that Burrus, a colleague of Seneca's was the one into whose custody St Paul was intrusted as a prisoner at Rome. x

From these circumstances it is thought Seneca may have been among the readers or listeners of St Paul, but in this as in the other case there is no probability, though it may be possible that Seneca may have heard, through the slaves of his own household, of the new religious movement from Jerusalem, and which had even then

† Farrar's Seekers after God. p. 167.

Book of the Acts &c Chapt. XXIV. 23 & Chapt. XXVII. 3.

found lodgment in Rome.

But though there may be resemblances of style and feeling between the two writings, there is a wide chasm which separates the two; for at the best in the Stoic, Seneca, there is but blind submission to an absolute law, no tender grace of meekness, no moral sequences between life here and hereafter; all errors, but mistakes of ignorance, and man himself the only arbiter, to say when he may withdraw from life †

On the other hand, these meditations of Seneca appear to have supplied the place of religious principles to the better classes of Roman society, and were no less useful to the lower classes, in providing truths and offering sympathy, to aid them in ^{the} stern conflict of life.

And if these moral reflections, seem to us, at one insufficient, or at another time overdone, we should not undervalue them, but pay due credit to their worth, remembering they were written to counteract the current of vice and folly in an age of luxury and sensualism.

Epictitus.

Among those who attended on the Emperor Nero, was a profligate young courtier named Epaphroditus, in whose household was a mean looking and deformed Phrygian slave boy, Epictitus, by name; whose very helplessness caused him to be unfit for any physical purposes, but whose keen intelligence determined his master to make use of him in the only way possible: as it was then fashionable for the great families of Rome to number among their slaves, poets, rhetoricians and philosophers, Epaphroditus was siezed with the common whim to have a philosophic slave, and so, sent Epictitus to the school of Musonius Rufus, to be trained in Stoic philosophy.

In some way the slave youth obtained his freedom, and began to teach, but with the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome, by Domitian (A.D. 89), he withdrew to Nicopolis and opened a school there: his teaching was taken down by his pupil

Arrian, and of what he wrote two books have come down to us, viz: *The Discourses* and *The Encheiridion*, or *Manual*.

Concerning Epictitus, Lecky says, "Pagan antiquity has left us no grander example; one, who while sounding the very abyss of human misery, and looking forward to death as to simple decomposition, was yet so filled with the sense of the divine presence that his life was one continued hymn to Providence". †

And this wise and good man, I have taken as the second representative, or exponent of the later Stoic doctrines.

There is the mark of deep and sincere piety in the thoughts of Epictitus, and while there are few or no speculations on the nature of God, yet he speaks of Deity as quite separate and apart from the universe (a departure from the old Pantheistic doctrine), upon which He displays His beneficence and His Providence.

† Lecky's *Morals* Vol. I. pp. 193-4.

Notice how *Epictetus* insists on the recognition of *God*, and that the chief duty of man, lies in obedience to him.

"As to piety towards the gods, you must know that this is the chief thing, to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist and that they administer the *ALL*, well and justly; and you must fix yourself in this principle (duty), to obey them and to yield to them in everything which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence.

For if you do so, you will never either blame the gods, nor will you accuse them of neglecting you."†

And in his excellent views on the subject of Providence, he further conveys the thought that not only should *God* be praised for His remembrance of men, but for the superior faculties, which He has given them. "It is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses two qualities: the faculty of seeing what belongs and

† *Enchiridion*, XXX.

happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition GOD has introduced man to be a spectator of Him and His works an interpreter. Come then do you also having observed these things, look to the faculties which you have. God has not only given us these faculties by which we shall be able to bear everything that happens, without being depressed or broken by it, but like a good king and true father, He has given us these faculties free from hinderance, and subject to no compulsion". †

And on this ground and of a relation with God, he argues, man should ever possess a sense of resignation to His will. "The wise and good man, after considering all these things, submits his own mind, to Him, who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state". x

Since man is related to God and is His kinsman, and is therefore Father of all, arises the

† Epicteti Dissertationes, Fragmenta et Enchiridion. Fred. Dübner
Liber I. Cap. 6.

x Lib. I. cap. 12.

thought with Epictitus, of human Brotherhood, and to an inquiry he made answer, "How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave? Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same descent from above?."

But if you have been put in any such higher place, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? will not remember who you are and whom you rule? that they are kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?" †

This thought is further expanded in its largest and most liberal sense. "Never in reply to the question, to what country do you belong, say that you are an Athenian or Corinthian, but that you are Citizen of the world . . . why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God, and why should he be afraid of anything which happens among men? Is kinship

† Dissert. Lib. I cap. 13.

with Caesar enough to enable us to live in safety? and to have God for your maker and father, shall not this release us from sorrow and fear.

In reference to possessions and worldly goods, he says, "Examine yourself whether you wish to be rich or to be happy: and if you wish to be rich, know that it is neither a blessing, nor is it altogether in your power; but if to be happy, know that it both is a blessing, and is in your power, since the former is but a temporary loan of fortune, but the gift of happiness is in the will."

"Wealth is not among the number of good things, extravagance is among the number of evils; sober-mindedness, of good things. The latter invites us to frugality, the former to extravagance." "As it is better to be in good health, being hard pressed on a little truckle bed, than to roll and be ill in some broad couch; so too it is better in a small competence to enjoy the calm of moderate desires than in the midst of superfluities to be discontent."

These thoughts are suggestive of the chief things in which men ought to be exercised, for he says,

"There are three things in which a man ought not to neglect. The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that he may not fail to get what he desires and not to fall into that which he does not desire; for failing in either produces an affect, which brings, perturbations, disorders, bad fortune, sorrows, envy and lamentation.

The second concerns the movements towards an object, and the movements from an object, or, what a man ought to do according to order and reason, as the maintaining of relations natural or acquired, as a pious man, a son, father or citizen,

The third concerns freedom from deception and rashness, and generally the assents; this has to do with those making proficiency, so that not even in sleep, intoxication or melancholy, any appearance unexamined may surprise us".[†]

Continuing this thought in another place, he

[†]. Dissert: Lib: III cap: 2

says, "In our power is our Will, all depends on it, things not in our power, are parts of the body, parents, brothers, children, country". †

"In what shall we place the Good? Is not health, life, children, parents, country." ×

With such sentiments as these, we are hardly prepared to receive his ascetic counsels, viz,

"We are inquiring about ordinary marriages and those free from distractions . . . we do not find the affair of marriage in this state of the world, a thing which is especially suited to the Cynic". #

He is however consistent in holding his Stoic views of public life, for, "He will hold himself aloof from public life in the form of politics or civil duties which will seem unworthy of his interest."

He recognizes the divine part in man, "the guardian angel", as Conscience. "Have not I within me a diviner, who has told me, the nature of good and of evil, and has explained

† Dissert: Lib. I. cap. 22.

× Ibid

Ibid

to me, the signs (marks) of both? what need have I then to consult the viscera of victims or flight of birds".[†]

His forbearance and forgiveness of faults in others is seen, to wit, "Ought not then this robber, this adulterer be destroyed? By no means say so; this man has been mistaken and deceived about the most important matters, not in the faculty of vision, but in the faculty which distinguishes good from bad?".^x

But though he has large charity for the misdoings of men, he has little patience with vain show and display; to him, only the moderate and temperate use of dress or other goods and indulgences, is the best type of excellence. #

On the matter of Suicide, he gives this advice, "Friends wait for God, when He shall give the signal and release you from this service, then, go to Him; but for the present, endure to dwell in this place where He has put you." //

[†] Dissert: Lib. II. cap. 7.

^x Ibid Lib. I. cap. 18.

Ibid Lib. III. cap. 1.

In all cases, we must be ready, he says, to so control ourselves and our wishes, as to resign the blessings which God has lent us. †

Taking our leave of Epictitus and withdrawing from Nicopolis, we return to Rome, to find that the Emperor Domitian, "who cleared Rome of what most shamed him", had been assassinated; and through the eloquence of Dion Chrysostom, one of the Stoic philosophers who addressed the army on behalf of Nerva, with such success, that the shout went up of, "Nerva Imperator"; and with Nerva began the reign of the Stoics.

Dion was made governor of Asia Minor, and afterwards the private chaplain of the Emperor Trajan, with whom he rode in the same triumphal chariot at the celebration of the Dacian victories.

It was Dion, again, who turned the fierceness of the mob from driving out philosophy

†. Enchiridion XL.

from Alexandria ; and who plead with the Romans on such pertinent topics, as, "the dignity of labor, the sin of slavery and the folly of turning hermit". He it was who urged Trajan to devote himself to the public service, and so well did the Emperor follow this counsel, that a public library was opened in the Capitol, while roads, canals, and bridges were built all over the empire.

Another Stoic teacher who returned from banishment at this time, was Euphrates ; one of his pupils was Pliny the younger, who, it is said, on excusing his neglect of philosophy owing to public duty, was told by his master, "To serve the state and execute justice, is the noblest part of philosophy". Under Trajan flourished scholars, as Pliny, Plutarch and Tacitus.

Trajan was succeeded by a third Stoic Emperor, Hadrian, whose whole bent was to reform whatever seemed amiss in the state ;

Lecky says, that the process of renovation which was begun under Augustus by the Stoic Labeo, was continued with great zeal under Hadrian, and there were few departments into which the catholic and humane principles of Stoicism were not to some degree carried out.

For fifteen years or two-thirds of his reign, he traversed the Empire a-foot, from one extent to the other, righting wrongs, improving public buildings and erecting new ones.

Hadrian adopted as his successor Antoninus, whose reign was so peaceful and just, that he was surnamed, "Pius", (dutiful) and seven of his successors, in memory of his wise rule called themselves ANTONINUS.

Of his many praise-worthy public acts, a few may be mentioned as an index of his character: taxation reduced, chastity of women and slaves protected, cruelty of masters and infidelity of husbands punished, public lectures on philosophy &c

provided for, unnecessary wars avoided; and other nations even, went so far to honor him, as to submit their disputes to his arbitration. He adopted as his son and successor,

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.


This wise and pious ruler was born 121 AD; he was early and carefully trained by Stoic masters, and on the death of the Emperor, succeeded to the throne: he at once showed his magnanimity by sharing the authority with Varus, upon whose death in a few years, he became sole ruler, but at a time most turbulent in the affairs of state. His quiet nature was more suited for peace than camp-life, but he felt called upon to spend most of his reign in the anxious, laborious duties of warfare.

He was diligent in duty, patient under trial, and ever maintained such sweetness of temper, as to be accounted "the purest and gentlest

spirit of all the pagan world"; and him, I have selected as ^{the} third representative or exponent of later-day Stoicism.

His philosophy is known as, "The Reflections," written in the midst of public business, or on the eve of battle, and in consequence are rather fragmentary.

Nothing seems to me, so practical a test of this man's purity, sincerity, and unselfishness, than his voluntary act of quitting for an indefinite period, the pomp, luxury and fascination of regal life at Rome, for the self-imposed task, for the public good, of leading his legions in an inglorious warfare against barbarians; and in so doing was obliged to incur innumerable dangers and hardships; while revolt, famine and pestilence were laying waste the empire, and yet finding time, amid all, to dwell on thoughts of duty with contemplations upon the problems of life here, and the mysteries of the life hereafter.



In these Reflections, as in the writings of Epictitus, we do not find any speculations about the nature of God, but he is nevertheless positive of the existence of God and His goodness to men.

To those who ask, he says, "Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them? I answer, in the first place they may be seen even with the eyes; in the second place, neither have I seen my own soul and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their goodness, from this I comprehend that they exist and I venerate them." †

The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a time they must tolerate continually men such as they are, and so many of them; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined to end so soon art thou wearied of enduring

the bad, and this too, when thou art one of them."[†]

In this last passage is a distinct declaration, I take it, of the sinfulness of all mankind, for he includes also himself as a sinner, which is a new conception in Stoic philosophy: and furthermore, to his mind, there is surely pardon for the erring, which he brings out in the following,

"Suppose that thou hast detached thyself from the natural unity—for thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off, yet here there is this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together again.

But consider the kindness, by which He has distinguished man, for He has put it in his power not to be separated at all from the universal; and when he has been separated, he has allowed him to return, and to be united and to resume his place as a part."[×]

In this restoration to the favor of God, of the


†. Com: Liber VII. 70.

× Ibid VIII. 34.

erring but penitent one, we can fairly recognize the teachings of the Christian doctrine, which is set forth in the parable of the Prodigal Son.

He further shows the imperfectibility of men here, but that all may improve; which the old school would not allow. "But how worthless are all these poor people who are engaged in matters political and as they suppose, are playing the philosopher! all drivellers. Well then, man, do what nature now requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look about thee to see if any one will observe it: nor yet expect Plato's Republic; but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men's opinions? and without a change of opinions what else is there than the slavery of men, who groan while they pretend to obey." †

And as in conflict with and disapproval of the old doctrine of no pardonable error, and



no degrees of vice, he says, "Theophrastus in his comparison of bad acts, such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind, says, like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through desire are more blameable, than those which are committed through anger. For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through desire being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more intemperate and more romanish in his offences. Rightly then and in a manner worthy of philosophy, he said, that the offense which is committed with pleasure is more blameable than that which is committed with pain; and on the whole, the one is more like a person who has been first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other is moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing something by desire." †

† Liber II. 10.

In contrast with the boastfulness and pride of Virtue of former days, he presents a new picture of purity and holiness; "There remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice.

And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest and contented life, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the end of life, to which a man, ought to come pure, tranquil, ready to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to his lot." †

It is to be regretted that Aurelius is not more enlightened on the subject of the immor-

†. Liber III. 16.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

RECEIVED

FROM

DATE

BY

REMARKS

LIBRARY

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO, ILL.

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

-tality of the soul; on this doctrine, he is very vague and unsatisfactory.

How can it be, he says, that the gods, after having arranged all things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men, and very good men, who have had most communion with the divinity, when they have once died should never exist again, but should be completely extinguished."†

On the nature of "the good," he holds,

"If thou canst pass thy life in an equal flow of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination". ×

"And another thing too, that very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life".#

On the subject of Pleasure, he writes,
And indeed he who pursues pleasure, as

† Liber XII. 5.

X " V. 34.

" VII. 5

1848

a good and avoids pain as an evil, is guilty of impiety." †

As to that "universal solvent", Sympathy, which was an almost unknown quantity in the old school, it seems to afford him pleasure, as he recurs to this social bond. "When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those who live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the virtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with us, and present themselves in abundance, as far as possible." X

As though he would show the absurdity of that side of the ideal wise man of former days, which knew no pity, he has the courage to say, "The things from men should be dear to us by reason of kinship: and sometimes even in a

†. Liber IX. 1.

X " VI. 48.

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

2. The second part of the paper focuses on the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

3. The third part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

4. The fourth part of the paper focuses on the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

5. The fifth part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

6. The sixth part of the paper focuses on the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

7. The seventh part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

8. The eighth part of the paper focuses on the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

9. The ninth part of the paper discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

10. The tenth part of the paper focuses on the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business or organization. The author provides a detailed explanation of the various methods used to collect and analyze data, highlighting the importance of consistency and accuracy in the process.

manner, they move our pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and bad." †

Holding such feelings of sympathy and compassion, we are quite prepared for the fraternal bond of common humanity which he proposes,

"If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common; if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do: if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens: if this is so, we are members of some political community: if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will any one say, that the whole human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and capacity for law." ×

Such sentiments indicate a spirit which

† Liber II. 13.

× " IV. 4.

could bear no enmity, and capable of rising to the benignant duty of love of enemies,

"The best way to avenge myself is not to become like the wrong doer" †

"He who wrongs me is my kinsman in unity of the spirit and divine sonship, and I cannot be angry with my brother." ×

This amiable disposition of our author, does not allow even disagreeable looks,

"a scowling look is altogether unnatural".#

He insists too on present duty being done at once, reminding us of that thief of time procrastination, "Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how often thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not use it." //

And so ardent a lover of the truth is he, that though the old school permitted a lie under certain circumstances, he on the contrary cannot see that it is ever justifiable,

† Liber VI. 6

× " II. 1.

" VII. 24.

"He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety, inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving." †

And, as if to cut at the root of all irregularities of conduct and infractions of the moral law, he asks that we inquire into the spiritual state and the governing motives, by self-examination,

"When thou art offended at any man's fault, forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in what manner thou dost err thyself." ×

Of passing the time, he advises,
 "The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every day as the last." #

With so noble a nature as Marcus Aurelius possessed, one, it seems to me, more in harmony with Christian graces than Stoic apathy, we greatly wonder how he could have per-

† Liber. IX. 1.

× "

" .VII. 69.

-mitted the persecution of the Christians.

But before condemning him for permitting such cruelty, we should recall certain facts in history. It was during his reign, that the Romans, had to some extent renewed their zeal for the worship of their national divinities, and the oracles began to speak once more; whose utterances were most likely directed against the Christians, holding them responsible for the national calamities of famine, flood, pestilence and rebellion, which then afflicted the Empire.

Hence a fierce popular cry arose against the Christians, as the cause of these calamities, and as showing the wrath of the gods, and calling for the enforcement of the law of Trajan which punished the confession of Christianity with death.

The Emperor knew very little of the

Christians, or perhaps was wrongly informed about them, and learning of the popular clamor against them, and fearful lest they might be a menace to the public safety, at a time of great danger, he suffered Trajan's law to have its course, though no persecution took place in Italy.

It is not likely that one so tender and sympathetic of heart, as to forbid gladiators fighting except with blunted weapons; rope-dancers in performing to have nets to catch their fall; and slaves assisted by law to gain their freedom, would willingly and needlessly be guilty of such cruelty to the Christians.

With this exception, he was one of the wisest best and most complete characters of the ancient world. He died March 180. A.D, aged 59 years, during a campaign against the Germanic people: his body was conveyed to Rome and received the honor of deification.

Having now reviewed the teachings of both the old and the later Masters of the Stoic School of Morals, we note certain elements common to both, viz;

The supreme end of life, is not so much to seek wisdom or pleasure, as it is to be Virtuous, or to live in conformity to Nature.

Virtue, is a knowledge of the good:

Vice, nothing but error or ignorance, while all else, is, Indifferent.

Virtue furthermore consists not in a life of contemplation or speculation, but in activity

The Will acting under the control of Reason, is the cause of Virtue: Reason is the great creative law; every part of it (creation), including man, must be subordinated to Reason; and the nature of man is to live in agreement with it.

Pleasures and pains of the body are to be despised, only the pleasures and pains of

the mind are worthy of consideration.

All mankind are viewed as a common Brotherhood; Death has no fears for them, and voluntary departure from life under certain circumstances encouraged.

All this may be summed up in a single sentence, "the effort to attain a perfect life in conformity with universal laws." †

Having seen wherein the two agree, it is but proper, we should examine wherein they differ.

The old Stoics in their renunciation of the world are Ascetic, unsympathetic, selfish: with distorted views of perfection, developing only a single side of their nature and leaving their minds narrow and contracted.

While the later Stoics are more amiable, benevolent, with enlarged views of moral sympathy, and more cultivation of heart and mind.

The old are arrogant and proud, at

† Grant's Aristotle Vol. I, p.

war with the whole emotional side of man, even looking on Pity as a vice.

The later, breathe the spirit of humility and gentleness, are charitable, forgiving and pitiful.

The old concept of Deity is Pantheistic, and though they hold the doctrine of Providence, yet their thoughts are less fixed on Deity and more on Virtue.

The later, recognize more clearly a distinct personal Divinity, and intensify the doctrine of Providence, by acknowledging man's need of God.

The old, admit a future limited existence, but deny everlasting life after death.

The later, believe in an eternity, and in the immortality of the soul, with some notion of future rewards and punishment.

The old, hold up the ideal wise man as a model, asserting with the exception

of immortality he is equal to, and in some respects superior to God.

The later, see how paradoxical the notion is and confess the wise man cannot be imitated.

By this contrast, it may readily be seen, that the System was profoundly modified by the later Stoics, into which they wrought gentle manners, moral progress, humane principles, deeper religious convictions, softening many asperities, and making it mild and beneficent.

As a System, it was nevertheless inadequate to leaven the mass of brutality in the world: though it had done much to foster Virtue, it did but little to repress Vice, and never could free itself from that hardness of its nature, which rendered it unsuited for an advanced civilization.

True, it raised up many great and

good men, and some high in authority, who exerted their powers on behalf of Virtue: it rendered excellent service in the formation of Roman jurisprudence and implanted a deep reverence for law: yet it never was and never could become a popular system, for the reason that "a moral system to govern society must adapt itself to common characters, mingled motives, and influence natures that never can rise to the heroic;" but the system accomplished a good work in preparing the way for Christianity.

At the time of the death of Marcus Aurelius, Stoicism was then at its height, but declined with the decadence of the Empire, while Christianity increased in power, until the Emperor Constantine himself in the early part of the fourth century, became a proselyte to the faith, and is known in history as the first Christian Emperor.

Less than one hundred years after this, Rome was over run and captured by the barbarians, when the old conditions of society were ruptured; Stoicism dropped out of sight, or at least, ceased to be a distinct Philosophy, and the conquering hordes of barbarians were finally brought under the influence of Christianity.

In closing we cannot but acknowledge our debt to Stoicism: for its presentation of the inner life, which is the rather to be chosen than sensual pleasures; for its spirit of self-sacrifice, simplicity, purity, moral progress, triumphs of the will in subduing the baser part of man's nature, and for its example of devotion to duty.

Also for its conception of mankind,

as forming a common *Brotherhood*, and each member standing in relation to *God*: that birth, rank, country and wealth, are but the merest accidents, only *Virtue* can make one man superior to another: for its lofty ideals, of whatever is good, great noble, strong and true, — for all these motives and principles we are indebted.

And these are more than enough to fill us with admiration for those souls in the by-gone ages of the world's history, who, through spiritual gloom and sadness, unaided by any clear views of *Truth*, and no divine light to help, save the feeble ray of reason to guide their uncertain steps, strove to seek and realize a personal *God*.

May we not earnestly believe, that "God was their God, as well as ours, who left Himself not without witness

among them; who as they blindly felt after Him, suffered their groping hands to grasp the hem of His garment".

"And His Spirit was with them though unseen and unknown, purifying and sanctifying the temple of their hearts, and sending gleams of light through the darkness to comfort their uncertainties and make intercession for them."

Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus.

Most glorious of immortals, O Zeus of many names,
 Almighty and everlasting sovereign of nature, directing all
 in accordance with law, thee it is fitting that all mortals should
 address. Thee all this universe, as it rolls circling round the
 earth, obeys whensoever thou dost guide and gladly owns thy
 sway. Such a minister thou holdest in thy invincible
 hands - the two edged, fiery, ever living thunderbolt, under
 whose stroke all nature shudders.

No work upon earth is wrought apart from thee lord, nor
 though the divine etherial sphere, nor upon the sea, save
 only whatsoever deeds wicked men do in their own foolish-
 ness.

Nay thou knowest how to make even
 the rough smooth and to bring order out of disorder;
 and things not friendly are friendly in thy sight.

For so hast thou fitted all things together, the
 good with the evil, that there might be one eternal law
 over all.

Deliver men from all ignorance, Banish it,

father from their soul, and grant them to obtain wisdom, whereon relying thou rulest all things with justice.

Authorities.

<i>History of Greece, Vol. II.</i>	<i>Geo. Grote</i>
" " <i>Philosophy, Vol. I.</i>	<i>Dr F. Ueberweg.</i>
" " " " <i>, Vol. I.</i>	<i>F. D. Maurice.</i>
" " " " "	<i>Geo. H. Lewes.</i>
<i>Historia Critica Philosophiae, Vol. I.</i>	<i>W^m Enfield, LL.D.</i>
<i>Outlines of Greek Philosophy.</i>	<i>Dr E. Zeller.</i>
<i>The Philosophy of the Stoics, Epicureans &c.</i>	<i>Dr E. Zeller.</i>
<i>Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae.</i>	<i>J. Bywater.</i>
<i>Heracliti Ephesii Fragmenta.</i>	<i>Dr G. W. Patrick.</i>
<i>The Ancient World and Christianity.</i>	<i>Dr E. De Pressense</i>
<i>Outlines of Ethics.</i>	<i>Prof. Henry Sidgwick</i>
<i>Greek Life and Thought</i>	<i>J. P. Mahaffy</i>
<i>Greek World under Roman Sway.</i>	<i>J. P. Mahaffy</i>
<i>History of European Morals, Vols I & II.</i>	<i>W. E. H. Lecky.</i>
<i>Attic Orators.</i>	<i>Prof. R. E. Jebb.</i>
<i>Plutarch's Lives.</i>	<i>A. H. Clough.</i>
<i>C. Cornelii Taciti Opera.</i>	<i>Carolus Halm</i>

Diogenis Laërtii de Vitis, Dogmatibus et Apophtheg-
matibus Clarorum Philosophorum. J. P. Kraus

L. Annaei Senecae Opera. Frid: Haase.

Epicteti Dissertationes Fragmenta et Enchirid-
ion. J. Dübner.

Moarci Antonini Imperatoris Commentariorum,
Quos Ipsi Sibi Scripsit. J. Dübner

Seekers after God. Dean Farrar.

The New Testament.

Grant's Aristotle. Vol. I.

Encyclopædia Britannica. article Greece.

3 1198 05528 1849



N/1198/05528/1849X